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Volcanic riskEffective natural hazard risk assessment requires the characterisation of both hazards and vulnerabilities of
exposed elements. Volcanic hazard assessment is at an advanced state and is a considerable focus of volcanic sci-
entific inquiry, whereas comprehensive vulnerability assessment is lacking. Cataloguing and analysing volcanic
impacts provide insight on likely societal and physical vulnerabilities during future eruptions. This paper reviews
documented disruption and physical damage of critical infrastructure elements resulting from four volcanic
hazards (tephra fall, pyroclastic density currents, lavaflows and lahars) of eruptions in the last 100 years.Wede-
fine critical infrastructure as including energy sector infrastructure, water supply and wastewater networks,
transportation routes, communications, and critical components. Common trends of impacts and vulnerabilities
are summarised, which can be used to assess and reduce volcanic risk for future eruptions. In general, tephra falls
cause disruption to these infrastructure sectors, reducing their functionality, whilst flow hazards (pyroclastic
density currents, lava flows and lahars) are more destructive causing considerable permanent damage. Volcanic
risk assessment should include quantification of vulnerabilities and we challenge the volcanology community to
address this through the implementation of a standardised vulnerability assessment methodology and the
development and use of fragility functions, as has been successfully implemented in other natural hazard fields.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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The aim of natural hazard risk assessment is to evaluate the extent
and nature of risk in a particular area by evaluating potential hazards
that together could harm people, property and services (UNISDR,
2009). Risk assessments are an integral part of the risk management
process (Fig. 1) and comprise hazard, exposure and vulnerability assess-
ments (Marzocchi et al., 2012). Recent natural disasters such as the
Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland (2010), the Tōhoku earthquake and
tsunami in Japan (2011), Hurricane Sandy in the USA (2012) andHazard 
assessment
Vulnerability 
assessment
Exposure 
assessment
Risk 
mitigation
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Risk management
Fig. 1. Schematic description of components and process followed during natural hazard
risk management.Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013) highlight the need for effec-
tive natural hazard risk management and sustainable development
(UNISDR, 2014). Various studies have identified society's increasing
vulnerability to disasters as a consequence of population expansion in
hazardous areas and increasing economic and environmental strains
(Rougier et al., 2013). Risk assessment and management are essential
for identifying, avoiding and minimising losses associated with natural
hazard impacts. Usingquantitative risk assessment provides a numerical
estimation of risk which can facilitate comparisons between different
natural hazards and locations and allow prioritisation of risk mitigation
strategies to increase society's resilience to these hazards. Risk mitiga-
tion strategies can be broadly classified as:
(1) Land-use planning (citing) used to decrease exposure of people,
buildings and infrastructure to natural hazards.
(2) System and component design to improve resilience if exposed
to natural hazards
(3) Contingency planning (i.e., preparedness and response) used to
reduce the impacts of natural hazards and decrease restoration
and recovery times.
A challenge for volcanic risk assessment is the multi-hazard charac-
teristic of volcanic eruptions (Sparks et al., 2013). Tephra falls, pyroclastic
density currents (PDCs), lava flows and lahars can occur simultaneously
or sequentially and over differing spatial and temporal scales, potentially
adversely affecting society (see Table 1 for hazard descriptions). The
threat to society is considerable: there are at least ~600 million people
living in areas that could be affected by volcanic eruptions (Auker et al.,
2013). As populations increase in volcanically active areas, exposure
and vulnerability to volcanic hazards will increase (Chester et al., 2000).
However, pre-emptive hazard assessment, volcanic monitoring, early
warning, crisis management and other mitigative strategies can reduce
the impact on society (Sparks et al., 2013). For example, the number of
likely fatalities was reduced by two orders of magnitude during the
Table 1
Description of hazard origin, transport, composition, primary damaging characteristics and common hazard intensity metrics for tephra falls, pyroclastic density currents (PDCs), lava flows and lahars.
Hazard Hazard characteristics Primary damaging characteristics Hazard intensity metric (HIM) definitions
Tephra fall • Origin: explosive volcanic eruptions or fire fountaining as a result
of magma fragmentation.
• Transport: dispersed in convective eruption plumes up to 40–
50 km vertically and thousands of kilometres laterally.a,b,c
• Composition: vitric (volcanic glass), crystalline and/or lithic par-
ticles. Blocks and bombs (N64 mm in diameter), lapilli (2–
64 mm) and ash (b2 mm).d
• Loading: relates tephra thickness and bulk density. Increased load-
ing leads to structural damage of buildings and infrastructure.e
• Thickness: similar to loading and generally decreases exponentially
with distance from the vent.f
• Dispersal: tephra can be dispersed over wide extents. Tephra de-
posits may be eroded and remobilised by wind and/or water for
long periods post-eruption.g
• Grainsize: smaller particles are dispersed further from the vent and
can penetrate smaller openings than larger particles.
• Surface chemistry: tephra particles have surface coatings of soluble
salts as a result of scavenging in volcanic plumes.h Salts may be
released upon contact with water, resulting in water
contamination.i Acidic coatings may cause corrosion of metals.j
• Abrasiveness: tephra is highly abrasive due to the hardness and
angular morphology of individual particles.k
• Thickness (common unit: mm): accumulated thickness of tephra
fall.
• Static load (common units: kg/m2, kPa): mass of tephra per unit
area on a surface. Indicates load on an object in the vertical direc-
tion.
• Particle density (common unit: kg/m3): the density of individual
particles influences their mobility and settling rate in liquids.
• Surface chemistry (common unit: mg/kg dry weight for individual
elements): concentration of soluble salt layer on the surface of
tephra particles.
• Grainsize: particle size distribution of tephra at a particular site.
• Moisture content (common unit: vol. %): water content of tephra
deposit. Influenced by plume dynamics, environmental conditions
during and subsequent to deposition.
• Hardness: particle hardness influences abrasiveness of tephra de-
posits.
• Atmospheric concentration (common unit: μg/m3): concentration
of tephra particles suspended in air. Is relevant for aircraft safety,
visibility and human health.
PDC • Origin: (1) collapse of an unstable eruption column, (2) directed
blast, (3) low pyroclastic fountaining, and (4) lava dome
collapse.b,l,m
• Transport: gravity-driven flows which accelerate down slope at
velocities up to 300 m/sn and travel distances of tens of
kilometres.o
• Composition: mixtures of generally hot volcanic ejecta and gas.p
• Dynamic pressure: relate the flows density to its velocity. Dynamic
pressures can be on the order of tens of kilopascalsq enough to
damage or destroy buildings and infrastructure.
• Run-out distance: PDCs can flow distances of tens of kilometres, are
generally confined to valleys,o although overtopping can unpre-
dictably occur.m
• Temperature: may reach 1100 °Cm, sufficient to burn common
building materials.r
• Abrasiveness: pyroclastic material is highly abrasive and in combi-
nation with high flow velocity can cause significant abrasion to
impacted surfaces.
• Dynamic pressure (common unit: kPa): the kinetic energy per unit
volume of the flow which changes with flow density and velocity.
Used to infer lateral impacts.
• Velocity (common unit: m/s): velocity of the PDC during emplace-
ment. Can be used instead of dynamic pressure if PDC density is
unknown.
• Temperature (common unit: °C): temperature of the PDC at em-
placement.
• Thickness of deposit (common unit: mm): thickness of the PDC
deposit after emplacement has ceased.
Lava flow • Origin: outpourings of molten rock from volcanic vents or fissures.
• Transport: flows emplaced as a dynamically continuous unit elon-
gated downslope. Lengths are typically b10 km and velocities
~10's km/h, although higher velocities are documented.s
• Composition: the majority of flows are basaltic in composition al-
though high silica and non-silicate flows occur.s,t
• Morphology: flows tend to travel along confined paths as cohesive,
sometimes massive, units (10 m thick) which impact and inun-
date objects in the flow path. Flows solidify on cooling.
• Temperature: are between 800–1200 °Cs during eruption, suffi-
cient to ignite fires.
• Presence of lava: whether lava is present at a particular location,
regardless of lava flow depth.
• Depth of flow (common unit: mm): depth of the solidified lava
flow.
• Dynamic pressure (common unit: kPa): the kinetic energy per unit
volume of the flow which changes with flow density and velocity.
Used to infer lateral impacts.
• Velocity (common unit: m/s): velocity of the lava flow during em-
placement. Can be used instead of dynamic pressure if flow densi-
ty is unknown.
• Temperature (common unit: °C): temperature of the flow. Ambient
temperature around flow margins is equally important for infra-
structure damage considerations.
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• Cooling duration (common units: hours, days): time that it takes
for a lava flow to cool sufficiently to reinstate infrastructure on top
of flow.
Lahar • Origin: (1) eruption of hot pyroclastic material onto ice or snow,
(2) eruptions through crater lakes, (3) breakout of crater lakes or
other water bodies, and (4) rainfall after eruptions of voluminous
tephra.u
• Transport: gravity-driven flows which travel downslope at veloci-
ties of 10 m/s and travel 10's km.b
• Composition: slurry of volcaniclastic material (i.e., tephra) and
water other than normal streamflow.v
• Velocity: can travel at high velocities which can partially damage
or destroy buildings and infrastructure in flow path.
• Erosive: commonly erosive which can destabilise structures (e.g.,
bridge piers and abutments) located in or near to flow channels.
• Run-out distance: can travel for long distances and inundate large
areas.
• Depth: commonly up to tens of metres in valleys and thin veneers
outside of valleysw which is sufficient to bury infrastructure and
sometimes inundate buildings and structure.
• Temporal: lahars may occur post eruption (“secondary”) for many
years as rain remobilises pyroclastic material, prolonging hazard
impact.x
• Dynamic pressure (common unit: kPa): the kinetic energy per unit
volume of the flow which changes with flow density and velocity.
Used to infer lateral impacts.
• Velocity (common unit: m/s): velocity of the lahar during em-
placement. Can be used instead of dynamic pressure if lahar den-
sity is unknown.
• Thickness of deposit (common unit: mm): thickness of the lahar
deposit remaining after emplacement.
• Depth of flow (common unit: mm): depth of the lahar during em-
placement. Depth of flow can be greater than deposit thickness.
a Carey and Bursik (2000).
b Parfitt and Wilson (2008).
c Lockwood and Hazlett (2010).
d Cashman et al. (2000).
e Spence et al. (1996).
f Johnston (1997).
g Wilson et al. (2011).
h Óskarsson (1980).
i Witham et al. (2005).
j Oze et al. (2013).
k Wilson et al. (2012b).
l Branney and Kokelaar (2002).
m Nakada (2000).
n Wilson and Houghton (2000).
o Valentine and Fisher (2000).
p Burgisser and Bergantz (2002).
q Clarke and Voight (2000).
r Blong (1984).
s Kilburn (2000).
t Griffiths (2000).
u Waitt (2013).
v Smith and Fritz (1989).
w Vallance (2000).
x Gran et al. (2011).
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were evacuated prior to the climactic eruption (Sparks et al., 2013). The
death toll since 1900 from volcanic eruptions is small compared to
other natural hazards; for example, in that time period there were
~280,000 fatalities from volcanic eruptions (Auker et al., 2013) compared
to N2million from earthquakes (Holzer and Savage, 2013). However, dis-
ruption, damage and economic loss from volcanic eruptions are consider-
able, althoughhard to quantify (Sparks et al., 2013). One aspect ofmodern
society that is commonly and sometimes severely disrupted anddamaged
by volcanic hazards is critical infrastructure (Blong, 1984; Wilson et al.,
2012b), the focus of this paper. Critical infrastructure is defined as a net-
work of man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively
to produce and distribute essential goods and services (Rinaldi et al.,
2001) which are heavily relied upon by society for daily function (Dunn
et al., 2013). The critical infrastructure discussed here includes electrical
supply networks, water andwastewater networks, terrestrial transporta-
tion networks and communications. We also consider buildings, heating,
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and electronic equip-
ment common to all infrastructure sectors. There has been a lack of
systematic, quantitative collection and reporting of impacts to critical
infrastructure, which has hindered quantitative risk assessment.
In this review we build an evidence base of disruption and direct
damage to critical infrastructure sectors from tephra falls, PDCs, lava
flows and lahars, and distil common impact trends to contribute to im-
proved quantitative volcanic risk assessment. Section 2 of this paper
places this review in the context of natural hazard risk assessment and
summarises physical vulnerability assessments in volcanology and
other natural hazards whilst also highlighting some of the challenges
facedwith adoption of robust quantitative volcanic vulnerability assess-
ment. Section 3 summarises the current knowledge of physical impacts
to critical infrastructure from volcanic hazards highlighting vulnerable
infrastructure components and impact mechanisms from a range of in-
ternational case studies. In Section 4wediscuss general trends in impact
severity and at which hazard intensities disruption and damage may be
likely to occur for each hazard.We also provide an approach to estimate
vulnerability with impact states and fragility functions. We conclude in
Section 5 with a discussion of future directions for continued develop-
ment of quantitative physical vulnerability assessment with the goal
to improve volcanic risk assessment. Definitions of terms used through-
out this review are in Table 2.
2. Natural hazard risk assessment
Natural hazard risk assessments combine hazard, exposure, and vul-
nerability assessments (Fig. 1) in order to determine the risk posed to a
site, area or region from a single- or multi-hazard source. Risk assess-
ment informs the development of mitigation strategies and effective
risk management, reducing loss and increasing resilience (Papathoma-
Köhle et al., 2011). We provide a brief description of these assessments
and refer the reader to Rougier et al. (2013) and Smith (2013) for in-
depth reviews of natural hazard and risk assessments.
Hazard assessment procedures are similar for all natural hazards and
concern determining hazard occurrence frequency, the spatial extent
(hazard footprint) and hazard intensities (e.g., tephra thickness) within
the hazard footprint (Smith, 2013). Deterministic (scenario-based) or
probabilistic (range of scenarios) hazard models are used, the choice
of which is determined by data availability and the type of assessment
required (Panza et al., 2011). Hazard assessment outputs are commonly
in the form of hazardmapswhich showhazard intensity as a function of
spatial extent or hazard curves which show exceedance probability of
certain hazard intensities at a given location. Exposure assessments iden-
tify the number, typology and location of elements (e.g., buildings, infra-
structure and people) which have the potential to be impacted by the
hazard(s) of interest. Exposure assessments can be at any scale, from
site specific to regional, although an inverse relationship generally exists
between level of detail and spatial scale. These assessments commonlymake use of existing asset inventory data sets (e.g., asset databases
held by local and regional authorities: Schmidt et al., 2011), although
project specific data sets may be obtained through field investigation
or remote sensing (e.g., Foulser-Piggott et al., 2014; Jenkins et al.,
2014a). Vulnerability assessments are concernedwith the consequences
of natural hazard impacts on exposed elements and may be undertaken
in physical, economic and/or social contexts (Fuchs et al., 2012) (see
Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion).
Risk assessments are the combination of hazard, exposure and
vulnerability assessments (Fig. 1) and determine the nature and ex-
tent of risk to a site, area or region of interest. Assessments can be
qualitative (descriptive data) or quantitative (measurable data) or
a combination of both, depending on the nature of available data
and the purpose of the assessment (Jelínek et al., 2012). If possible,
quantitative assessments are preferred because they can facilitate a
more precise comparison between risks, although results can be
expressed using qualitative descriptions such as ‘high’, ‘medium’ or
‘low’ risk (Jelínek et al., 2012) to facilitate effective communication
(Uzielli et al., 2008). There is an increasing use of multi-hazard risk
assessment (e.g., Schneider and Schauer, 2006; Schmidt et al.,
2011; Marzocchi et al., 2012; UNISDR, 2013) for particular sites or re-
gions that may be impacted by more than one natural hazard as the
combined effect of all hazards influences risk (Zuccaro et al., 2008).
Hazard, exposure and vulnerability assessments for each hazard are
combined to create a multi-hazard risk index or ranking for a partic-
ular area (Marzocchi et al., 2012).
Whilst in theory both hazard and vulnerability aspects of risk assess-
ment should be advanced to the same level of detail, there is often dis-
crepancy between the two, notably for volcanic hazards (Sparks et al.,
2013). Quantitative assessments of various volcanic hazards and their
processes are well advanced (e.g., Bonadonna, 2006; Wadge, 2009;
Jenkins et al., 2012), with fieldwork, laboratory studies and numerical
models providing qualitative outputs for the spatial and temporal ex-
tent and intensities of hazards, whilst taking into account uncertainties.
Vulnerability assessments are less advanced. For tephra fall and PDC
there has been steady progress in qualitative understanding of vulnera-
bility for structures, agriculture and some critical infrastructure, howev-
er quantitative assessment of vulnerability over a range of hazard
intensities is more sparse. This lack of comprehensive understanding
can preclude robust quantitative volcanic risk assessment (Wilson
et al., 2012b; Jenkins et al., 2014a).
2.1. Natural hazard vulnerability assessments
There are different types of vulnerability (e.g., physical, social, eco-
nomic; see Fuchs et al., 2012); in this paper we restrict our focus to
physical vulnerability, that is, the susceptibility of an infrastructure sys-
tem or component to impact from a natural hazard. There are three
main approaches for physical vulnerability assessment: the use of vul-
nerability indicators, damage matrices, and fragility or vulnerability
functions (Kappes et al., 2012). Fig. 2 briefly summarises these ap-
proaches and provides examples of when they may be used in volcanic
vulnerability assessment.
Data for deriving physical vulnerability assessments come from em-
pirical, analytical, expert judgement, and hybrid sources (Rossetto and
Elnashai, 2003). Table 3 presents some of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each approach. The most common data source for all natural
hazards, including volcanic eruptions, is observational (empirical) data
collected during or immediately after a hazardous event. These data
are generally scarce due to the danger and limited access in impacted
zones, the expense of collecting such data and the infrequent nature
of some hazards (Jenkins et al., 2014a), although some remote sensing
techniques allow data collection in hazardous areas (e.g., Sanyal and
Lu, 2005; Mas et al., 2012; Dong and Shan, 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014a).
The advantage of empirical data is that a range of hazard intensities
and exposed element properties are taken into account, which are
Table 2
Definitions of terms used throughout this review.
Term Definition Reference
Natural hazard A dangerous natural phenomenon that may cause loss of life, property damage and disruption. UNISDR (2009)
Exposure People, property, systems and other elements present in the hazard zone that are subject to potential loss. UNISDR (2009)
Vulnerability The characteristic of an element that makes it susceptible to the effects of a hazard. UNISDR (2009)
Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences. UNISDR (2009)
Risk assessment A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk. UNISDR (2009)
Risk management The systematic approach of managing uncertainty and minimising potential loss through the implementation of
mitigation strategies.
UNISDR (2009)
Resilience The ability of a system to absorb and recovery from the effects of a hazard. UNISDR (2009)
Critical infrastructure A network of man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively to produce and distribute essential goods
and services.
Sectors include: electrical supply networks, water and wastewater networks, transportation routes, communications,
electronics and air conditioning.
Rinaldi et al. (2001)
Impact Function of the hazard and vulnerability on the exposed asset. Jenkins et al. (2014b)
Impact mechanism The different methods by which a natural hazard can impact infrastructure. –
Impact severity The relative level of damage to elements. –
Disruption Impact caused to infrastructure prior to the onset of physical damage. –
Physical damage General term to describe damage to infrastructure causing complete loss of function until repair or replacement is
undertaken.
–
Hazard intensity The magnitude of a hazard at a particular site. We use the terms “low” and “high” to describe the end members of
hazard intensity.
–
Hazard intensity metric (HIM) Different hazard properties which can impact infrastructure. These properties can be measured and are related to the
level of impact.
–
Fragility function Equations which express the probability of differing levels of damage sustained for different infrastructure as a
function of hazard intensity.
Rossetto et al. (2013)
Mitigation The lessening of the adverse impacts of hazards through policy or structural strategies. UNISDR (2009)
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confirm and calibrate other data sources and assessments (e.g., Turner
et al., 2013), although this is unfortunately rare (Rossetto and
Elnashai, 2003). In the absence of empirical data, other forms of dataDescription
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Fig. 2.Graphical representation and descriptions of the threemost common approaches to asse
trices and fragility functions.
Zuccaro et al. (2008).such as analytical (experimental), expert judgement or hybrid combi-
nations can be sought (Table 3).
A quick note on risk assessment in other natural hazard fields iswar-
ranted to place volcanic risk assessment in context. Earthquake riskindicator
indicators or indices represent a property of a system and provide 
egarding its susceptibility to natural hazard(s) impacts (Birkmann, 2006;
., 2012).
in social sciences, but less common in physical vulnerability
due to difficulties in applicability of indicators to characterise a large 
hazards (Kappes et al., 2012).
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 European roofs (reprinted from Zuccaro et al. (2008) with permission 
.
ss natural hazard vulnerability: vulnerability indicators (Aspinall et al., 2011); damagema-
Table 3
Advantages and disadvantages of the different methodological approaches used to develop fragility and vulnerability functions in natural hazard vulnerability assessment.
Modified from Schultz et al. (2010).
Approach Data Advantages Disadvantages
Empirical • Controlled experiments
• Post-event damage assessment
• Repeatable experiments
• Range of hazard and infrastructure
characteristics taken into account
• Difficulties in replicating natural hazards in
laboratory
• Site, region, structure specific
• Scarce data of variable quality
Judgement-based • Expert elicitation • Assess wide range of impacts, some
of which have not been previously
observed
• Not limited by impact data or models
• Can be used to refine other functions
• Quality depends on expert's expertise and
subjectivity
• Can be difficult to validate
• Differing and contradictory opinions
Analytical • Numerical modelling • Increased reliability and repeatability
and reduced bias
• Can be extrapolated to new situations
• Substantial computation
• Based on simplifications and assumptions
Hybrid • Combination of different
approaches
• Reduce limitations by combining different
approaches
• Reduce uncertainties in fragility functions
• Limitations are the same as individual approaches
Table 4
Existing critical infrastructure fragility and vulnerability functions developed for different
volcanic hazards. We found no published peer-reviewed fragility functions for water sup-
ply, communication networks or lava flows. See Supplementary material 1 for a review of
these functions.
Tephra fall PDC Lahar
Electrical supply a
Wastewater networks b
Transportation networks b
Buildings b,c,d d,e,f e
Critical components g
a Wardman et al. (2012c).
b Kaye (2007).
c Spence et al. (2005).
d Zuccaro et al. (2008).
e Zuccaro and De Gregorio (2013).
f Spence et al. (2007).
g Wilson et al. (2012a).
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that estimate damage, disruption and casualty impacts (Reitherman,
2012), which have informed the establishment of robust seismic build-
ing codes; pioneeringwork began in the 1980s focusing on seismic safe-
ty of nuclear power plants (e.g., Kennedy et al., 1980; Kennedy and
Ravindra, 1984). The field has well-established methods for post-
earthquake building assessments (Rossetto et al., 2010) and for deriving
fragility functions to probabilistically estimate structural damage
(Porter et al., 2007). Other natural hazard fields employ similar empiri-
cal approaches to earthquake vulnerability assessment but are less well
defined. Analytical modelling approaches are also used to develop fra-
gility functions (e.g., Vaidogas and Juocevičius, 2008; Koshimura et al.,
2009; Quan Luna et al., 2011). As afield, volcanology trails behind earth-
quake risk assessments but is on par with landslide and tsunami risk
assessment.
2.2. Volcanic perspective on vulnerability assessments
Volcanic risk assessment has typically focused on loss of life and
therefore physical vulnerability assessments have primarily targeted
building damage and occupant exposure with limited analysis of other
physical societally-relevant assets such as critical infrastructure.
2.2.1. Data sources
Observational data is the key data set for modern volcano risk as-
sessment, and began in earnest with observations in the aftermath of
the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens, USA which affected critical infra-
structure, health and economic activities across Washington (Lipman
and Mullineaux, 1981). A formative review of the effects of volcanic
eruptions is presented by Blong (1984), who documents a wide range
of volcanic hazard impacts on buildings, infrastructure, agriculture,
economy and people. The Blong (1984) review is a significant contribu-
tion to the field and is the basis for the current understanding of impacts
to the built environment and still relied upon heavily today. Since the
eruption of Mt. St. Helens, field observations following eruptions from
Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (e.g., tephra induced building damage: Spence
et al., 1996), Rabaul in 1994 (e.g., tephra induced building damage:
Blong, 2003a), Montserrat in 1997 (e.g., PDC induced building damage:
Baxter et al., 2005), Merapi in 2010 (e.g., PDC induced building and
infrastructure damage: Jenkins et al., 2013) and other case studies
(e.g., Wilson et al., 2012b; Jenkins et al., 2014a) have strengthened the
knowledge regarding volcanic impacts to society, particularly around
building damage and occupant safety. In order to continue collecting
high quality empirical data Jenkins et al. (2014a) proposes a standardised
physical vulnerability survey methodology detailing minimum data re-
quirements to ensure quantifiable data collection.Where observational data are lacking, experimental assessment
(e.g., Spence et al., 2004a; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Wardman et al., 2012c)
has been used to estimate vulnerability. Experimental data are sparse
due to difficulties in accurately replicating somevolcanic hazard proper-
ties in the laboratory (Jenkins et al., 2014a). Theoretical calculations
(e.g., Petrazzuoli and Zuccaro, 2004; Jenkins et al., 2013) and expert elic-
itation (e.g., Coppersmith et al., 2009; Aspinall and Crooke, 2013) can
also be used to produce both qualitative and quantitative vulnerability
assessments that can be applied to a range of element typology and haz-
ard properties.
2.2.2. Quantifying vulnerability
Quantifying vulnerability of buildings is more common within the
literature as volcanic risk assessment is primarily concerned with loss
of life. Jenkins et al. (2014b) suggest that vulnerability assessments of
buildings can also be undertaken to: (1) identify buildings that may
benefit from mitigation measures; (2) quantify potential damage and
loss of buildings following successful evacuation; and (3) support devel-
opment of improved construction guidelines for new buildings. As such,
numerous studies (Spence et al., 2005, 2007; Marti et al., 2008; Zuccaro
et al., 2008) and field observations (Spence et al., 1996; Baxter et al.,
2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) have quantitatively estimated building vul-
nerability for volcanic hazards, particularly tephra falls and PDCs. The
outputs of these studies are similar to those of earthquake risk assess-
ment and describe building damage as a function of hazard intensity
using hazard intensity thresholds, damage matrices and fragility and
vulnerability functions. See Supplementary material 1 for a brief review
of fragility and vulnerability functions derived for volcanic hazards. The
majority of these studies have assessed vulnerability to European
155G. Wilson et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 286 (2014) 148–182buildings with a large focus on buildings in Naples, Italy and those sur-
roundingMt. Vesuvius. The primary reason for the focus on these build-
ings is because there is a large population living close to or on the flanks
of one of the most dangerous volcanoes in the world (Baxter et al.,
2008). As such, these assessments apply only to European building ty-
pologies would need to be re-evaluated and refined for other areas of
interest.
In contrast, vulnerability assessment for critical infrastructure sys-
tems and components is not well established, with the majority of as-
sessments qualitative in nature. However, damage or disruption to
critical infrastructure is likely to have a higher magnitude impact on so-
ciety than building damage (Jenkins et al., 2014a) due to the intercon-
nectedness of these infrastructure (Wilson et al., 2012b). The New
Zealand Volcanic Impacts Study Group (NZ VISG) has over the past
15–20 years systematically assessed tephra fall impacts to critical infra-
structure through post eruption impact assessment and semi-structure
interviews with critical infrastructure managers (Wilson et al., 2012b,
2014). These studies (e.g., Wilson et al., 2012b) provide a large amount
of qualitative data describing the likely impacts and points ofTable 5
Summary table of documented volcanic impacts to critical infrastructure grouped by decade in
Sector Damage Tephra falls
ylppuslacirtcelE
Flashover # * §
Abrasion – dry #
Abrasion – wet *
Corrosion
Gravel contamination
Physical damage to
lines
§
Water supply
network
Pump, motor abrasion # *
Pipe, channel blockage × # *
Pipe ruptures
Intake & filter 
blockages
× *
Water quality decrease × # §
Water shortages × *
Wastewater 
network
Pump, motor abrasion × #
Pipe blockage × # §
Infill of tanks §
Filter blockage §
Treatment disruption # §
Transportation
Road damage
Road burial/closure * §
Vehicle damage # * §
Traction/visibility
reduction
# * §
Airport closure or 
damage
× # *
Aircraft damage × # *
Railway closure or 
damage
× #
Port closure or damage ×
Ship damage §
Communications
Physical damage # §
Signal interference # * §
sgnidliuB
Lateral impact damage
Roof damage/ collapse * §
Fire
Corrosion *
Gutter damage * §
Burial × §
Critical
components
Computer damage # §
HVAC damage *vulnerability for each critical infrastructure sector as a result of tephra
fall. Some studies have attempted to quantitatively relate infrastructure
disruption and damage to hazard intensity using intensity thresholds
(e.g., Jenkins et al., 2014b) and fragility functions (Table 4 and Supple-
mentary material 1). However, these quantitative relationships have
been based on few empirical data and therefore are associated with
sizeable uncertainty. There is a need to refine infrastructure vulnerabil-
ity estimates for tephra fall and volcanic flow hazards in order to have
robust volcanic risk assessments, hence the need for this review and
continued and standardised research in this field.
2.2.3. Challenges in assessing physical vulnerability
There are a number of aspects when assessing physical vulnerability
in regards to volcanic hazards which make fully-quantitative ap-
proaches difficult to achieve. Douglas (2007) attributed this to a number
of challenges, including:
(1) Volcanic eruptions aremulti-hazard events and therefore critical
infrastructure sites can by impacted by multiple sequential ordicating the prevalence and occurrence of impacts over time.
PDCs Lava flows Lahars
+
+
*
+
+
§ × § §
+
+ × *
* § × § §
+ ×
+ §
+
# § × # § # * +
+ § # § +
+ # * # × #
+ #
+ * § §
+
+ × # × #
+ ×
×
*
+
× # * § + × # * § # * § +
+ #
× * + # §
# § × # § # *
+
Table 6
Summary of the main vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure sectors for impacts from tephra falls, PDCs, lava flows and lahars and whether impacts can be mitigated by site exclusion (avoidance), physical design of infrastructure or response and
operational planning.
Infrastructure
sector
Hazard
Tephra fall PDC Lava flow Lahar
Electrical supply • Vulnerability: Flashover of insulators, abrasion of
HEP turbines, line breakage, tephra ingress into
critical equipment.
• Site exclusiona: No
• Designb: Increase insulation and use of anti-
pollution strategies to minimise flashover.
Strengthen structures or use tephra shedding de-
signs to minimise tephra loading. Increase sys-
tem redundancy.
• Contingency planningc: Tephra clean-up opera-
tions and methods. Use of backup generators.
• Vulnerability: Breakage of towers, poles and lines,
damage to other structures, abrasion of HEP tur-
bines.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Strengthen some structures if possible.
Locating services underground.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations and
methods.
• Vulnerability: Breakage of towers, poles and lines,
damage and inundation to other structures.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from known flow
paths.
• Design: Locating services underground. Con-
struction of embankments around critical com-
ponents.
• Contingency planning: –
• Vulnerability: Breakage of towers, poles and lines,
damage to other structures, sedimentation in
HEP storage reservoirs, abrasion of HEP turbines.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Locating services underground. Con-
struction of embankments around
critical components. Use of hardened
materials to limit abrasion.
• Contingency planning: Use of early warning sys-
tems, rain gauges and flow sensors. Clean-up op-
erations and methods.
Water supply
network
• Vulnerability: Increased turbidity,
decreased water quality, increased water de-
mand, clogging of filters, abrasion of moving
parts in motors and pumps, corrosion of metals.
• Site exclusion: No
• Design: Strengthen structures to minimise tephra
load damage. Cover open filter beds, clarifiers
and pumps. Consider the use of groundwater
sources to increase resilience.
• Contingency planning: Tephra clean-up
operations using dry methods (brooms, shovels).
Anticipate increased water demand and possible
contamination. Increase maintenance frequency.
Close water intakes until turbidity decreases.
• Vulnerability: Lateral loading damage to tanks,
well heads and pipes.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Strengthen all structures at treatment fa-
cility. Strengthen pipes crossing flow paths or
locate them deep underground.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations and
methods. Anticipate possible water
contamination.
• Vulnerability: Burial of underground access
points, rupturing of pipes.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from known flow
paths.
• Design: Construction of embankments around
critical components.
• Contingency planning: –
• Vulnerability: Lateral loading damage to tanks,
well heads and pipes, erosive damage to under-
ground pipes, abrasion damage to river intake
structures.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Use of abrasion resistant materials for in-
take structures in rivers.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations and
methods. Anticipate possible water contamina-
tion. Close water intakes until turbidity de-
creases. Use of early warning systems.
Wastewater
network
• Vulnerability: Abrasion damage to components
with moving parts, blockage of filters and
screens, ingress into pipe network and treatment
facility.
• Site exclusion: No
• Design: Strengthen structures to minimise tephra
load damage. Cover exposed equipment, tanks
and pumps. Limit tephra ingress by utilising sep-
arate stormwater system.
• Contingency planning: Tephra clean-up
operations and methods. Increase maintenance
frequency. Consider bypassing pumping stations
and treatment facilities to protect against further
equipment damage.
• Vulnerability: Lateral loading damage to struc-
tures and equipment, ingress into pipe network.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Strengthen all structures at treatment fa-
cility. Strengthen pipes crossing flow paths or
locate them deep underground.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations and
methods.
• Vulnerability: Lateral loading damage to struc-
tures and equipment. Burial of underground ac-
cess points.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from known flow
paths.
• Design: Construction of embankments around
critical components.
• Contingency planning: –
• Vulnerability: Lateral loading damage to struc-
tures and equipment, ingress into pipe network.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Construction of bunds around
oxidation ponds to prevent lahar ingress.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations and
methods. Use of early warning systems.
Transportation
networks
• Vulnerability: Reduced visibility and traction,
covering of road and runway markings, abrasion
and corrosion damage to vehicles, jamming of
rail switches, and disruption to airspace.
• Site exclusion: No
• Vulnerability: Burial of roads, rail networks and
airport runways, increased sedimentation into
harbours, erosive damage and destruction of
bridges, extensive damage to vehicles.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all routes
• Vulnerability: Burial of roads, rail networks and
airport runways.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all routes
should be located away from known flow paths.
• Design: Construction of embankments around
• Vulnerability: Burial of roads, rail networks and
airport runways, increased sedimentation into
harbours, erosive damage and destruction of
bridges, extensive damage to vehicles.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all routes
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• Design: Strengthen buildings (airports, train sta-
tions) and increase roof pitch to minimise tephra
load damage.
• Contingency planning: Tephra clean-up opera-
tions and methods. Road, rail and airport closure
protocols. Established tephra avoidance guide-
lines for aircraft.
should be located away from valleys and known
flow paths.
• Design: Raise bridge decks over valleys and
strengthen piers and abutments.
• Contingency planning: Identify alternate routes if
primary routes are damaged. Anticipate the need
for temporary bridges. Clean-up operations and
methods.
critical parts of the network.
• Contingency planning: –
should be located away from valleys and known
flow paths.
• Design: Automated barriers to close road and rail
routes when lahars occur. Raise bridge decks
over valleys and strengthen piers and abutments.
• Contingency planning: Use of early warning sys-
tems. Identify alternate routes if primary routes
are damaged. Anticipate the need for temporary
bridges.
Communications • Vulnerability: Signal interference and attenua-
tion, corrosion of metal surfaces.
• Site exclusion: No
• Design: Strengthen structures or use tephra
shedding designs to minimise tephra loading.
Sealing of equipment to prevent tephra ingress.
• Contingency planning: Tephra clean-up opera-
tions and methods. Use of different redundant
and backup communication systems. Increase
maintenance frequency.
• Vulnerability: Signal interference and attenua-
tion, damage of towers, poles and masts, burial of
equipment.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Locate services underground or
inside strengthened buildings. Strengthen all
equipment, especially those crossing flow paths.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations. In-
crease maintenance frequency.
• Vulnerability: Damage of towers, poles and masts,
burial of equipment.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from known flow
paths.
• Design: Construction of embankments around
critical parts of the network. Locate equipment
inside strengthened buildings.
• Contingency planning: –
• Vulnerability: Damage of towers, poles and masts,
burial of equipment.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Locate services underground or
inside strengthened buildings. Strengthen all
equipment, especially those crossing flow paths.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations. In-
crease maintenance frequency. Use of early
warning systems.
Critical
components
• Vulnerability: Clogging of air filters, overheating,
short circuits, abrasion of moving parts, and cor-
rosion of metal surfaces.
• Site exclusion: No
• Design: Seal equipment and locate equipment in-
side sealed buildings to prevent tephra ingress.
Install air filters designed for fine particles. Install
hoods over HVAC air intakes.
• Contingency planning: Tephra clean-up opera-
tions and methods. Increase maintenance
frequency.
• Vulnerability: Destruction and transportation of
equipment.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Relocation of equipment into strength-
ened buildings.
• Contingency planning: Clean-up operations and
methods. Increase maintenance frequency.
• Vulnerability: Destruction and burial of equip-
ment.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from known flow
paths.
• Design: Relocation of equipment into strength-
ened buildings.
• Contingency planning: –
• Vulnerability: Destruction and transportation of
equipment.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all equip-
ment should be located away from valleys and
known flow paths.
• Design: Relocation of equipment into strength-
ened buildings.
• Contingency planning: Use of early warning sys-
tems. Clean-up operations and methods. Increase
maintenance frequency.
Buildings • Vulnerability: Blocked and/or damaged gutters,
tephra ingress, corrosion of metal surfaces, and
structural damage to roof.
• Site exclusion: No
• Design: Strengthen roofs, increasing roof pitch to
reduce static load.
• Contingency planning: Sealing of building to pre-
vent tephra ingress. Removing tephra from roof
to prevent collapse.
• Vulnerability: Damage to windows and doors,
structural damage to whole building, inundation
and burial, ignition of fires.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all buildings
should be located away from valleys and known
flow paths.
• Design: Strengthen walls and avoid having them
perpendicular to flow path to reduce dynamic
load. Use of shutters on openings to prevent in-
gress.
• Contingency planning: Evacuation planning and
implementation.
• Vulnerability: Structural damage to whole build-
ing, burial, ignition of fires.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all buildings
should be located away from known flow paths.
• Design: Strengthen building walls. Use of non-
flammable materials.
• Contingency planning: –
• Vulnerability: Inundation and burial,
structural damage to walls, float building off
foundations.
• Site exclusion: Yes — where possible all buildings
should be located away from valleys and known
flow paths.
• Design: Strengthen walls and avoid having them
perpendicular to flow path to reduce dynamic
load. Fix buildings to foundations.
• Contingency planning: Use of early warning sys-
tems. Evacuation planning and implementation.
a A ‘yes’ for site exclusion indicates that infrastructure development should be avoided at a particular site as damage from a hazard cannot be mitigated.
b Design considerations include altering the design of components and infrastructure sectors to lower their vulnerability to disruption and damage fromvolcanic hazards (e.g., strengthen building roof) and the design of site protectionmeasures for
flow hazards (e.g., construction of diversion barriers).
c Contingency planning involves making decisions and plans in advance about themanagement and response to volcanic eruptions to minimise impact severity and decrease recovery time (e.g., evacuation plans, clean-up plans and availability of
resources).
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mechanisms to be considered, again adding complexity.
(2) Individual volcanic hazards can cause different types of damage to the same asset
depending on the hazard properties. For example, tephra fall can damage ametal
roof by increasing the static load causing it to collapse, in addition to damaging it
through corrosion and abrasion.
(3) There are no widely adopted volcanic building codes or building performance
guidelines which regulate infrastructure design in volcanic hazard zones and
prompt vulnerability assessment and fragility function development.
(4) There is a diverse range of infrastructure system design, configuration and com-
ponents which make it difficult to assign generic vulnerability assessments for
all infrastructure sectors.
(5) Time scales leadingup to volcanic eruptions can be long compared to earthquakes
(discrete events). Long eruption lead times can allow pre-event warnings,
resulting in evacuations which remove the danger to life. Given the focus on
loss of life vulnerabilities, the mitigative measure of mandatory, encouraged, or
self-evacuations reduces social pressure to evaluate building fragility.
(6) Volcanic episodeswithmultiple hazardous events can take place over a long time,
adding complexity to vulnerability assessments.
(7) Difficulties in accuratelymeasuring hazard intensity (e.g., bulk densities of lahars,
dynamic pressures of PDCs, tephra thickness). Often PDC and lahar parameters
are inferred from deposits due to personal safety concerns and destruction of
measuring instruments during flow emplacement. Deposits, especially tephra
fall, may be reworked by erosional processes and thus incorrectly measured
(Engwell et al., 2013).
(8) Volcanic eruptions are infrequent events, resulting in a lack of quantitative obser-
vational impact data. Volcanic post event assessments are primarily focused on
the hazard itself and not the impacts.3. Historically observed impacts to critical infrastructure
In order to estimate vulnerability to critical infrastructure during fu-
ture eruptions, insights can be gained from analysing past impacts. In
this section we review the literature to provide a semi-qualitative over-
viewof disruption and damage to critical infrastructure by volcanic haz-
ards.We consider impacts from tephra falls, PDCs, lava flows and lahars
(see Table 1 for hazard descriptions) to electrical supply networks,
water supply and wastewater networks, terrestrial transportation net-
works, communications, computers and air conditioning. As buildings
and critical components (HVAC and electronic equipment) are widely
used as key components in each infrastructure sector we finish with a
dedicated section for critical components and building impacts
(Sections 3.6 and 3.7, respectively). Table 5 tabulates documented im-
pact occurrence per decade for the past century for each infrastructure
sector indicating the prevalence and occurrence of impacts over time.
Table 6 summarises themain vulnerabilities for each infrastructure sec-
tor and summarises mitigation actions based on site exclusion, infra-
structure design and operation and response planning.
3.1. Electrical supply networksElectricity is essential for a functioning modern society and the
continued operation of other critical infrastructure. Electrical equip-
ment and apparatus used in power generation, transmission and dis-
tribution is typically located above ground, comprising of a series of
nodes (power stations, substations) connected by extensive corri-
dors (transmission and distribution lines) which can stretch thou-
sands of kilometres (Fig. 3A). The ubiquitous scope of the electrical
supply network increases its level of exposure making the network
particularly vulnerable to volcanic hazards (Wardman et al.,
2012c). Volcanic hazards affect the electric supply network in a num-
ber of ways (Fig. 4), the most common being temporary outages
caused by insulator flashover as a result of tephra accumulation
(Wardman et al., 2012c). Many of the impacts discussed below can
occur at any location within the network as similar equipment is lo-
cated throughout the network (Fig. 3A). See Wardman et al. (2012c)
for a review of tephra fall impacts and mitigation strategies for the
electrical supply network.3.1.1. Insulator flashover
The most common tephra fall impact on the electrical supply net-
work is insulator flashover (Wardman et al., 2012c). A flashover is an
unintended electrical discharge (short circuit) around the insulator
and typically leads to a line fault. Dry tephra has high resistivity but in
the presence of moisture resistivity becomes very low (Wardman
et al., 2012b). Sowhen tephra is deposited on insulators, in the presence
ofmoisture, aflashovermay result. Itmay only take one insulator to suf-
fer flashover for an entire line of potentially hundreds of kilometres to
be disrupted. Tephra, in this case, can result from direct falls, PDCs or
from wind remobilisation of unconsolidated tephra deposits. Flashover
has been observedworldwide after volcanic eruptionswhere tephra ac-
cumulations exceed ~3 mm (Fig. 4). However tephra moisture content
is the critical factor controlling flashover occurrence, as dry tephra has
very low electrical conductivity (Wardman et al., 2012b). Insulator
and system design also influence flashover susceptibility. Wardman
et al. (2012c) found that tephra accumulations on the underside of insu-
lators are equally important as accumulations on the topside in
assessing vulnerability. Electrical supply providers can minimise tephra
induced flashover by increasing insulation, using anti-pollution designs
and cleaning strategies (Wardman et al., 2012c).
Tolerance to flashover faults and continued operation of electrical
networks have been documented in some cases (Fig. 4), although
Wardman et al. (2012c) suggest that they may be under-reported as it
is more common to document failures. Tolerance is observed over a
wide range of tephra fall thicknesses ranging from 2 to 300 mm. Differ-
ences in tolerance values are due to different component designs, teph-
ra properties and environmental conditions, as these parameters
influence how tephra affects insulators.
3.1.2. Damage to electrical lines
Volcanic flows have snapped poles and damaged electrical lines,
resulting in supply disruption, during volcanic eruptions of: Heimaey,
Iceland in 1973 (lava flows: Morgan, 2000); Mauna Loa, Hawaii in
1984 (lava flows: Associated Press, 1984; Hawaiian Volcano
Observatory, 1998a); Nyiragongo, Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC) in 2002 (lava flows: Baxter and Ancia, 2002); Chaitén, Chile in
2008 (lahars: Wilson et al., 2009); and Merapi in 2006 (PDCs: Wilson
et al., 2007). Fig. 5 shows that these impacts tend to occur at low hazard
intensities although the scarce evidence suggests that any presence of
volcanic flows is likely to cause disruption to electrical infrastructure.
Tephra accumulations on lines may cause them to break such as those
that occurred in the 2008 eruption of Chaitén, although here snow
added to the load on the lines (Wilson et al., 2012b). Flow deposits, es-
pecially solidified lava flows, will restrict access to buried services
(e.g., underground cables) limiting future serviceability.
3.1.3. Damage at generation sites
Hydroelectric power (HEP) turbines at generation sites are particu-
larly vulnerable to abrasion after tephra material (either from direct
fall or PDCs and lahars) is deposited into storage reservoirs. Tephra
suspended in reservoirs may pass through turbines causing abrasion
to them and other auxiliary components over time (Fig. 6A). Abrasion
reduces the performance and life span of turbines leading to turbine re-
placement (e.g., Meredith, 2007). For example, four turbines at the
Agoyan HEP station, Ecuador have been replaced over the last
21 years as a result of abrasion damage from ongoing tephra fall from
Volcán Tungurahua being deposited in the Pastaza catchment (Sword-
Daniels et al., 2011). Tephra properties (e.g., particle hardness andmor-
phology) and exposure time are theprimary controls on abrasion occur-
rencewith longer exposure times leading to increased abrasion severity
although turbine design, materials, protective coatings and mainte-
nance will also influence abrasion damage. Wind turbines and blades
are also at risk of abrasion by tephra particles andmay result in damage
and reduced performance similar to that caused by sand particles
(e.g., Khalfallah and Koliub, 2007; Dalili et al., 2009).
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being impacted by tephra fall is the Amatitlán plant located 3 km
north of Volcán Pacaya, Guatemala. During the 2010 eruption of Pacaya,
the plant received 20 cm of coarse tephra and bombs up to 250 mm in
diameter. The upward facing uncovered steam condenser fans suffered
abrasion damage and denting from falling blocks, rendering them non-
operational (Wardman et al., 2012a).Minor denting of intake and outlet
pipe cladding also occurred. The plant was shut down for three weeks
whilst cleaning was undertaken (Wardman et al., 2012a).
Lahars have been documented impacting river water intake systems
used for generation site cooling. After the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption,
lahars filled the Columbia River with sediment, the same river where
the now decommissioned Trojan Nuclear Power Plant had a water in-
take system. Fortunately the water intake was located in an area with
less sedimentation and the plant was off-line at the time of the eruption
for fuel replacement (Schuster, 1981).
New renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaic (PV)
panels may be impacted by volcanic hazards as they are open to the at-
mosphere; however there is limited empirical observation of this occur-
ring. One instance occurred during the 2011 eruption of Shinmoedake,
Japan, when tephra accumulated (b2 mm) on PV panels at the Univer-
sity of Miyazaki, 50 km east of the vent. PV panel performance wasreduced by ~60% (Ota et al., 2012) but recovered after rainfall removed
the tephra a few days later.
3.1.4. Clean-up disruption
Deposition of unconsolidated tephra deposits either from direct falls
orflows (PDCs and lahars) at electrical supply sitesmay require removal
to restore function. Tephra clean-up operations have been conducted by
electrical supply operators worldwide to minimise ongoing flashover
faults and prevent future tephra induced impacts (e.g., corrosion, abra-
sion) to their components and network (Fig. 4). Documented thick-
nesses of when cleaning occurs are varied; ranging from 1 mm after
eruptions at Tungurahua (1999–2010) to N100 mm after the eruption
of Pacaya in 2010 (Fig. 4). This range in thickness can be attributed to in-
frastructure design, tephra properties and the operational practices of
the particular electrical supply providers. In some instances cleaning
can be undertaken whilst components are energised, reducing the
need to shut down and limiting disruption (Wardman et al., 2012c),
however, controlled shutdowns may be necessary in order to protect
equipment and personnel (Sword-Daniels et al., 2011) (Fig. 4). Con-
trolled shutdowns will cause supply disruptions unless there are re-
dundant networks capable of supplying electricity whilst cleaning is
being undertaken.
Fig. 4. Summary of documented tephra fall impacts and disruption to the electrical network as a function of tephra thickness for (A) generation, (B) substations and (C) transmission and
distribution (modified fromWardman et al., 2012c). Note: only data where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted.
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Fig. 5. Summary of documented critical infrastructure impacts from (A) PDCs, (B) lava flows and (C) lahars as a function of hazard intensity. Note: only data where tephra thickness is
known or derived are plotted.
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Water supply networks are comprised of water source, water treat-
ment and storage sites as well as a vast distribution network of mostly
underground pipes. There are numerous vulnerable componentsthroughout the network that can be impacted by volcanic hazards
(Fig. 3B). The majority of documented impacts to water supply are
due to tephra falls causing disruption and minor damage (Fig. 7A).
The less frequent volcanic flow impacts tend to cause physical damage
(Fig. 5). Stewart et al. (2009b) group impacts to water networks into
Fig. 6. (A) Abrasion damage to a turbine removed from the Agoyan hydro electric power station, Ecuador as a result of exposure to tephra laden water derived from the 1999–2010 erup-
tions of Volcán Tungurahua (photo: Johnny Wardman). (B) Houses covered with a thin layer of tephra after the eruption of Mt. Kelud on February 14, 2014 (photo: Dwi Oblo).
(C) personnel cleaning tephra from the Bariloche, Argentina water treatment plant after the June 4, 2011 eruption of PCCVC (photo: Carol Stewart). (D) Laboratory experiments to deter-
mine the settling rate of tephra in water. Each beaker contains a different tephra and shows the turbidity after 1 h of settling (photo: J White).
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ity; and (3) water demand issues which are very much controlled by
system design. We follow this structure here.
3.2.1. Physical damage
Physical damage to water supply networks tends to be caused by
volcanic flows, heavy tephra falls and prolonged exposure to tephra.
Volcanic flows have caused complete destruction of water supply
infrastructure as a result of increased lateral loading (Fig. 5). Groundwa-
ter well heads, springs, reservoirs and pipes were damaged around
Montserrat by PDCs (Howe, 2003) and lahars (CDERA, 2006) during
the 1995 eruption of Soufrière Hills volcano. Water pipes have been
damaged and buried by lahars around Mayon volcano, Philippines
(Nasol, 2001; Smithsonian Institution, 2002) and by lava flows in
Goma, DRC after the 2002 eruption of Nyiragongo (Smithsonian
Institution, 2001; Baxter and Ancia, 2002). These examples show that
water supply infrastructure located above ground in or near flow
paths (i.e., river valleys) are vulnerable to damage from volcanic flows
at low hazard intensities (Fig. 5).
Direct tephra falls or exposure to tephra–water slurries (such as
those in pipes) can causeminor physical damage in the formof abrasion
of moving parts (e.g., pumps, motors) and corrosion of metals. Damage
of this nature is documented after numerous eruptions (Stewart et al.,
2006; Wilson et al., 2012b) and is attributed to tephra thicknesses ex-
ceeding 30 mm (Fig. 7A), however duration of exposure is the primary
control on this type of damage, which is difficult to establish in these
cases. Tephra-induced damage reduces pumping efficiency which
leads to reduction in production and distribution capacity and increased
maintenance and/or repair of pumps and pipes.3.2.2. Disruption to water treatment
Disruption and increased maintenance from tephra falls are more
common than physical damage (Wilson et al., 2012b). Treatment dis-
ruption occurs when there is partial to complete blockage of water in-
takes, filters and pipes, as these have to be cleaned before normal
operation can resume (Fig. 6C). These impacts can occur at tephra thick-
nesses N1 mm (Fig. 7A). This can be illustrated from a case study from
the 2011 eruption of the Puyehue–Cordón Caulle volcanic complex
(PCCVC), Chile. During this eruption the town of Bariloche, 100 km
from the vent, received 30–45mm of tephra and the town of Jacobacci,
240 km from the vent, received 50 mm of tephra (Wilson et al., 2013).
The Bariloche plant was designed for low levels of suspended solids
and rawwater passed directly through the sand filters. During the erup-
tion, tephra laden water blocked the filter pore spaces requiring addi-
tional daily cleaning to return filter functionality and water treatment
capacity (Wilson et al., 2013). In contrast, in Jacobacci water supplies
were resilient to disruption as all pumphouses were enclosed and
water is sourced from groundwater wells (Wilson et al., 2013). This ex-
ample illustrates that system design will affect impact occurrence and
severity (Stewart et al., 2009b).3.2.3. Water quality impacts
Raw and treated water within water supply networks can also be
impacted by volcanic hazards and requires consideration in vulnerabil-
ity assessments. We refer the reader to Stewart et al. (2006, 2009a,
2009b) and Wilson et al. (2012b) for in-depth reviews.
Water quality impacts occur when tephra, from either tephra falls or
PDCs, enters water source areas or treatment facilities (Fig. 3B). Tephra
Fig. 7. (A) Summary of documented tephra fall impacts and disruption to (A) the water supply network and (B) thewastewater network as a function of tephra thickness. Note: only data
where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted.
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suspended particles) at tephra thicknesses N2 mm (Figs. 6D and 7A)
(Stewart et al., 2006). Chemical contamination of water occurs as solu-
ble surface coatings on fresh tephra particles dissolve readily upon con-
tact with water, releasing a range of ions (Witham et al., 2005; Delmelle
et al., 2007). Increased ion concentration may breach drinking water
standards, however this is usually only for short time periods (Stewart
et al., 2009a). Chemical contamination of water supplies from tephra
fall is difficult to predict prior to an eruption due to variability in soluble
salt and water chemistry, however it can occur at tephra thicknesses
N1 mm (Fig. 7). Turbidity and chemical contamination are commonly
controlled though management practices (Stewart et al., 2009b), how-
ever if turbidity becomes too high to treat effectively, the treatment
plant may have to be shut down. This occurred at the Ship Creek treat-
ment facility in Anchoragewhich received 3mmof tephra andwas shut
down for 30 h as a precaution following the 1992 eruption of Mt. Spurr,
Alaska (Wilson et al., 2012b).
3.2.4. Water shortages
After tephra falls, clean-up is commonly undertaken by washing
away unconsolidated deposits placing large demands on water re-
sources (Wilson et al., 2012b). In 1992 Anchorage, Alaska was covered
with 3 mm of tephra from the eruption of Mt. Spurr. After residentsbegan cleaning tephra deposits, there were severe water shortages
and loss of pressure in some parts of the city (Stewart et al., 2009b). In
contrast, successful management of water supply occurred in Esquel,
Argentina during the eruption of Volcán Chaitén in 2008. During resi-
dential clean-up supply exhaustion was avoided as authorities advised
residents to use alternative ‘dry’ clean-up methods such as use of
brooms and shovels (Stewart et al., 2009b).
3.3. Wastewater treatment networks
Wastewater networks comprise an underground network of pipes
and pumps and above ground treatment facilities (Fig. 8A).Wastewater
networks may be combined with stormwater systems or the two may
be completely separate. Combinedwastewater and stormwater systems
are more vulnerable to impacts than separate systems because uncon-
solidated tephra can easily enter the network through stormwater
drains (Barnard, 2009).
3.3.1. Physical damage
There is limited documented evidence of volcanic flows directly
impacting wastewater treatment facilities, except in the case of Plym-
outh, Monserrat in which the entire town was destroyed by pyroclastic
flows from Soufrière Hills volcano in 1997 (Rozdilsky, 2001). Abrasion
Exchange
Towers, masts 
& dishes
Satellites
Signal
Buried cable network
Roadside 
cabinet
Electronic 
equipment
B – Communication network
C – Transportation networks
A – Wastewater network
Buried networkCollection Treatment
Primary treatment
• Filtration
• Sediment scrapers
• Pumps
City waste
Pumps & pipe 
network
• Pumps & motors
• Pipes
• Filters
• BuildingsStormwater runoff
• Stormwater drains
1
3
2
Secondary treatment
• Aeration
• Bacterial treatment
Tertiary treatment
• Filtration
• UV disinfection
Discharge
Airport
Terminal buildings
• Communications
• Electronic equipment
• HVAC
Aircraft
• Engines
• Leading edges
• Windshields
• Instruments
Runway and aprons
• Paved surfaces
• Runway markings
Port
Ships
• Engines
• Air intakes
• Water intakes
Harbour
Wharf infrastructure
• Buildings
• Paved surfaces
• Cranes
Rail network
Tracks
• Signalling
• Track switching
• Communication
• Track ballast (gravel)
• Track surface
Buildings
Trains
• Engines
• Air intakes
• Communication
• Windshields
• Exterior surface
Road network
Vehicles
• Engines
• Air & oil filters
• Windshields
• PaintworkRoad network
• Roads
• Bridges
• Road markings
Fig. 8. Schematic of (A) wastewater and stormwater collection and treatment network, (B) typical components usedwithin communication networks and (C) air, rail, sea and road trans-
portation networks and vehicles. Components vulnerable to volcanic hazards are indicated in italics.
164 G. Wilson et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 286 (2014) 148–182damage to pumps, pipes, sediment scrapers, filtration components and
debris screens may occur as tephra laden slurries pass through these
components (Blong, 1984; Johnston, 1997; Barnard, 2009) again occur-
ring over extended periods of time. Eruptions from Mt. St. Helens
(1980), El Reventador, Ecuador (2002) and Pacaya (2010) show abra-
sion damage occurring over tephra thicknesses ranging from 4–
50 mm Fig. 7B.
3.3.2. Treatment disruption
Wastewater treatment can be disrupted if tephra is deposited direct-
ly onto treatment facilities as the capacities of open ponds, reactors and
clarifiers will be reduced (Fig. 7B) (Wilson et al., 2012b). For example,
disruption occurred during the 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano when
a combined sludge and sedimentation tank in Guatemala Citywas filled
with 4–5 m of tephra and had to be cleaned before continued operation
(Wilson et al., 2012b). Tephra can form large hardened and unpumpable
masses within the pipe networkwhich requiremanual removal (Wilson
et al., 2012b). Fig. 7B suggests that pipe blockage occurs with tephra
thicknesses N3 mm however accumulations larger than this may occur
in pipes. Blockages are likely to occur at distinct points and not through-
out the entire network.
If treatment disruption and/or damage become excessive, wastewa-
termight have to bypass the system and be discharged into the environ-
ment as untreated waste. This decision was made at the Yakima wastetreatment facility, USA after it received 10 mm of tephra from the
1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption (Blong, 1984). Tephra caused damage to
most of the treatment facility including the biofilters and a decision
was made four days after the eruption to bypass treatment and dis-
charge waste, after chlorination, into the Yakima River (Barnard,
2009). The decision was made because continued operation of the
plant would have caused greater damage andmore periods of discharge
would have occurred in the future.
3.4. Transportation networks
Transportation networks can be vast and cover large expanses of the
landscape, increasing their exposure to volcanic hazards similar to elec-
trical networks (Fig. 8C). Volcanic hazards have been documented ad-
versely affecting all transportation systems (e.g., road networks,
vehicles, rail tracks, trains, ports, ships, airports; Figs. 5 and 9A). Addi-
tionally, a number of cascading impacts may occur, not discussed here,
affecting other sectors which rely on transportation, as well as possible
evacuation and emergency response during a volcanic crisis.
3.4.1. Road networks and vehicles
3.4.1.1. Physical damage. Volcanic flows can cause physical damage to
road networks (Fig. 5). Perhaps the best known example of this was
Fig. 9. Summary of documented tephra fall impacts and disruption to (A) the transportation network and (B) critical components and communication equipment as a function of tephra
thickness. Note: only data where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted.
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extensive damage or destruction to 300 kmof road and 48 bridges in the
valleys draining the volcano (Blong, 1984). Bridges are particularly vul-
nerable as they generally cross flow paths and can be damaged by
scouring around abutments and piers and lateral loading (Nairn,
2002). Roadways located on flow channel banks are vulnerable to un-
dercutting by lahars. For example, threemonths after the 2010 eruption
of Merapi volcano, Indonesia, a lahar eroded a 60 m section of a major
highway causing its closure (Smithsonian Institution, 2011).
Lava flows, regardless of depth, cause irreparable damage to roads
around the world by simply crossing them (Fig. 5B). Since the early
1900s, numerous roads in Hawaii have been covered by lava from erup-
tions of Mauna Loa and Kilauea (Blong, 1984; Hawaiian Volcano
Observatory, 1998b, 2000). Thin (b1 m) flows buried a main road in
Goma during the 1977 Nyiragongo eruption, DRC (Blong, 1984) and
again during the 2002 eruption (Baxter et al., 2003). Sections of roadsalong the western and southern flanks of Mt. Etna, Italy have been bur-
ied numerous times by lava flows (Smithsonian Institution, 1999;
Andronico et al., 2005). These examples indicate that lava flows con-
form to a binary impactmodel based on the presence or absence of lava.
PDCs can move, overturn, burn and/or impact vehicles located in
flow paths. For example, vehicles within 15 km of Mt. St. Helens were
totally destroyed by the 1980 eruption (Blong, 1984). During the Sep-
tember 1991 Unzen, Japan eruption, a vehicle sustained extensive
panel damage, was burnt and transported 120 m by PDCs (Fujii and
Nakada, 1999). Lahars are also likely to completely damage vehicles as
they are carried downstream whilst being impacted by debris (Blong,
1984); however reports are limited. Tephra particles can damage vehi-
cles by abrading moving parts and blocking air and oil filters (Wilson
et al., 2012b). Windshields and paintwork are highly susceptible to
abrasion from tephra, which can be made worse by attempting to
clean these surfaces. Despite possible damage, resilience has also been
Fig. 10. A sequence of photos, from left to right, showing the remobilisation of tephra and decrease in visibility from a passing car as the car travels towards the observer near Volcán
Chaitén after the 2008 eruption.
Photos: G Leonard.
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eruption, 30 police cars whichwere used during tephra falls suffered no
long term damage, other than increased oil change frequency (Blong,
1984).
3.4.1.2. Disruption.Decreased road drivability in the formof traction loss,
covered roadmarkings and poor visibility (Fig. 10) can result from teph-
ra fall or remobilised unconsolidated tephra deposits (Nairn, 2002;
Leonard et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2012b). These impacts start to
occur at thin (~2–3 mm) tephra thicknesses (Fig. 9A). Disruption mayFig. 11. Burial and destruction of the runway and terminal building at the W. H. Bramble Airpo
been completely buried and abandoned.
Photos: Brian Digital.increase as authorities close roads, limit the number of circulating vehi-
cles or lower the speed limit to decrease the likelihood of traffic acci-
dents and limit tephra remobilisation. Clean-up operation following
tephra fall will restore road drivability although it may be possible to
drive on thick tephra deposits as they become compacted over time.
3.4.2. Rail network and trains
3.4.2.1. Physical damage.Rail bridges are vulnerable to lahar damage as
they are likely to cross lahar paths. In 1953, a lahar travelled downrt, Montserrat by a PDC during the 1997 eruption of Soufrière Hills. The runway has since
167G. Wilson et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 286 (2014) 148–182the Whangaehu River on the slopes of Mt. Ruapehu, New Zealand
and collapsed part of the Tangiwai rail bridge minutes before a pas-
senger train arrived (Scott, 2013). The train derailed and plunged
into the river; 151 people were killed. Valentine (1998) studied
damage from nuclear weapon blasts and inferred that PDC damage
to trains and rail tracks will occur at dynamic pressures N10 kPa.
Lava flows have blocked, covered and damaged railway lines numer-
ous times in the 1900s around Mt. Etna and Mt. Vesuvius, Italy ren-
dering them unusable (Blong, 1984). It is likely that railways lines
covered by lava flows of any depth will result in complete localised
damage.
3.4.2.2. Disruption. Disruption to the rail network is most likely from
tephra fall. The best documented example of tephra fall impacting rail
networks is the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption in Japan. Here 168 km of
track and 48 stations were impacted by tephra, causing delays and can-
cellations (Smithsonian Institution, 2010; Magill et al., 2013). The main
issueswere themechanical failure of track switches and loss of electrical
contact between the track and train (Fig. 9A), which in this rail network
is how communications are sent to the train operator. Problems did not
begin at a particular critical threshold, and therefore a zero tolerance
policy was adopted with services cancelled until tephra was removedFig. 12. (A, B) Extensive damage to a school in Chaitén town, Chile from a lahar after the 2008
ground around the foundations has been scoured. (C) Burial of a building, up to window level
also damaged. (D) A building in Chaitén town, inundated by a lahar after the 2008 eruption of
Photos: G Leonard.(Magill et al., 2013). Track ballast (crushed gravel used to support
tracks) was infiltrated by tephra, reducing its cushioning properties
and required frequent replacement. Tephra also infiltrated train carriages,
requiring additional cleaning. Damage was minimised by suspending
services in ashy conditions (Magill et al., 2013).
3.4.3. Ports and ships
Lahars and PDCs can affect harbours or water bodies due to in-
creased sedimentation. The most notable example occurred in the Co-
lumbia Shipping Canal, USA after the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption.
Lahar deposits filled it and reduced its capacity by 85%, rendering the
canal effectively unusable (Blong, 1984), affecting the economy in the
Pacific Northwest. Lava flows have also affected ports, the best known
event is the 1973 Eldfell eruption in Heimaey, Iceland. Lava threatened
to block the harbour entrance, however, an extensive lava cooling oper-
ation successfully prevented this from occurring (Williams and Moore,
2008).
Ships may sustain damage, such as abrasion of moving parts and
clogging of air filters and water intakes during tephra falls (Wilson
et al., 2012b). Vesiculated tephra (pumice and scoria) can float on
water creating a pumice raft, whichmay be ingested into ship water in-
takes (Wilson et al., 2012b) and/or disrupt shipping routes. There areeruption of Volcán Chaitén. Two exterior walls have been completely removed and the
, in Chaitén town from a lahar after the 2008 eruption of Volcán Chaitén. A power pole is
Volcán Chaitén.
168 G. Wilson et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 286 (2014) 148–182instances of resilience, for example, during the 2008 eruption of Okmok
Volcano, Alaska several boats receivedminor tephra fallwith no impacts
other than damage to one air filter (Neal et al., 2011).
3.4.4. Airports
3.4.4.1. Physical damage to airports. Volcanic flows can completely de-
stroy airports if they are located near river valleys or flood plains. During
the 1997 eruption of Soufrière Hills volcano, Montserrat, the W. H.
Bramble Airport was overrun and completely destroyed by PDCs
(Guffanti et al., 2009) (Fig. 11). Likewise, after the 2008 eruption of
Chaitén volcano, lahars completely buried the Chaitén airport runway
and inundated many associated buildings; the airport subsequently
closed (Pallister et al., 2010). A temporary airport runway was
established on awidened road to restore flights to the area. The runway
at Goma International Airport, DRC was inundated by lava during the
2002Nyiragongo eruption, reducing the runway's length by 1 km, how-
ever it is still usable for smaller sized aircraft (Baxter and Ancia, 2002).
Damage to aircraft in flight is well documented and includes: loss of
engine thrust as a result of tephra ingestion and adherence to turbine
blades; and abrasion of turbine blades, windshields, leading edges, pro-
truding probes and sensors. We refer the reader to Casadevall (1994),
the International Civil Aviation Organization (2007), Guffanti et al.
(2010), Dunn (2012) and Drexler et al. (2011) for comprehensive re-
views of tephra related damage to aircraft.
3.4.4.2. Disruption to aviation. Trace (~1mm) quantities of tephra depos-
ited on runways, taxiways and aprons can reduce visibility, cause loss of
traction, interrupt ground services and damage parked aircraft (Guffanti
et al., 2009) (Fig. 9A).When these impacts occur, airports typically close
due to flying safety regulations leading to widespread disruption. Be-
cause such thin tephra deposits can close airports, airports located in
distal areasmay also be affected resulting in widespread airport closure
and travel disruption. In addition, the presence of tephra in the atmo-
sphere can force the closure of airspace or the re-routing of travel
routes. For example, during the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull volca-
no, Iceland, European and North Atlantic airspace was closed for sixFig. 13. Summary of documented tephra fall impacts to buildings as a function of tephradays in April 2010 to prevent potential aircraft damage and limit risk
to life (Sammonds et al., 2010).
3.5. Communication networks
Communication networks are typically expansive and comprise a
wide range of components in many different network configurations
(Fig. 8B).
3.5.1. Physical damage to communication equipment
Volcanic flows are likely to cause considerable damage to communi-
cation infrastructure (e.g., tower, poles, lines) if they are situated in flow
paths or in areas close to the volcano, however evidence is scarce.
During the 1991 Unzen eruption, numerous utility poles were broken
at their bases after being impacted by PDCs (Clarke and Voight, 2000).
3.5.2. Disruption to communication equipment
Theoretically tephra particles may cause communication signal at-
tenuation and interference as it is known that dust storms cause this
type of disruption (e.g., Saleh and Abuhdima, 2011). A review by
Wilson et al. (2009) suggest that tephra induced signal attenuation
may preferentially affect low frequency (30–300 kHz) services. Signal
interference has been reported during tephra falls from Pacaya volcano,
Guatemala (Wardman et al., 2012a), Tungurahua volcano, Ecuador
(Sword-Daniels et al., 2011), Mt. Hudson, Chile (Wilson et al., 2011)
and Merapi volcano, Indonesia (Wilson et al., 2007) (Fig. 9B), however
these occurrences are poorly documented. In contrast, cellular and
ultra high frequency networks and telemetered sites operated without
interruption in Futaleufú, Chile, which received N150mmof tephra dur-
ing the 2008 Chaitén eruption (Wilson et al., 2012b).
3.6. Critical components
Wedefine critical components as those that are integral tomost crit-
ical infrastructure sectors such as heating, ventilation and air condition-
ing (HVAC) systems and electronic equipment. HVAC systems are used
inmost critical infrastructure sectors for internal environmental control,thickness. Note: only data where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted.
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(Wilson et al., 2012b).
3.6.1. Physical damage to critical components
The majority of HVAC and computing systems are physically small
and therefore very likely to be completely destroyed and carried away
by volcanic flows. In addition, the high temperatures of PDCs and lava
flows will likely melt plastics and the wet nature of lahars will cause
electrical short circuits. The only documented case that specifically
mentions volcanic flow impacts to electronics is de Bélizal et al.
(2013) who describe a lahar from Merapi volcano destroying a houseThin (~2 mm) tephra deposit on roof in 
Bariloche, Argentine after the 2011 
eruption of PCCVC (Photo: NikoNomad-
Shutterstock.com).
Disruption from cleaning tephra from roof 
in Bariloche, Argentine after the 2011 
eruption of PCCVC (Photo: Jo eMellado).
Thin (~50 mm) lahar deposit on road 
in Chaitén town, Chile after the 2008 
eruption of Chaitén. Road is still 
useable (Photo: G Leonard). 
Thick PDC deposit on road preventing 
access after the 2006 eruption of Merapi, 
Indonesia (Photo: Wilson et al. 2007).
Lava flow covering and blocking the 
Chain of Craters road, Hawaii (Photo: 
Jasperdo).
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Fig. 14. (A) Conceptualmodel of the continuumof impacts to critical infrastructure observed as
and damage) will occur at different hazard intensities for different volcanic hazards and for diff
range of each impact severity (tolerance, disruption and damage) as a function of hazard intens
ture design.in which all electronic equipment was lost and/or destroyed. Tephra
particles can cause abrasive damage to moving components such as
cooling fans, potentially resulting in fan failure. Abrasion is more likely
to occur with fine tephra particles that can penetrate fan bearings and
will occur over a long period of time (Barnard, 2009; Wilson et al.,
2012a).
3.6.2. Disruption to critical components
Filters and fans are particularly vulnerable to blockage from tephra
fall as these components are in direct contact with the atmosphere
(Wilson et al., 2012a) (Fig. 9B). These impacts may result inMinor gutter damage from tephra fall in 
Montserrat after the 1997 SoufrièreHills eruption 
(Photo: W.E. Scott-USGS).
Complete roof collapse at Subic Bay Naval 
Station, Philippines after the 1991 eruption of 
Pinatubo (Photo: Sgt Paul Bishop-US Navy).
Severe damage of a bridge by lahars in 2011 
after the 1999-2010 eruptions of Tungurahua, 
Ecuador (Photo: Sword-Daniels et al. 2011).
House covered and destroyed by lava flows 
after the 2001 eruption of Mt Etna, Italy 
(Photo: Kemal Taner/Shutterstock.com).
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Fig. 15. Relationship between critical infrastructure disruption and damage for investigat-
ed eruptions (1973–2011) as a result of tephra fall (blue), PDC (red), lava flow (orange)
and lahar (purple). Black line shows an idealised 1:1 relationship between disruption
and damage, where disruption are impacts that occur prior to the onset of physical dam-
age and damage are impacts that occur as a result of direct physical damage (Section 3).
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causing disruption to services. During the 1992 Mt. Spurr, Alaska
eruption, tephra fall (3 mm) blocked a number of HVAC system
filters. Fortunately no electronic equipment overheated due to the
cool ambient temperatures in Anchorage at the time (Wilson
et al., 2012b). Computers may also suffer from jamming of mechan-
ical components and keyboards and overheating under a thick cov-
ering of tephra (Gordon et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2012a). Generally
disruption appears to be temporary as once tephra has been
removed from the components, functionality is restored (Wilson
et al., 2012a).
3.7. Buildings
Buildings and other similar structures can be impacted by all volcanic
hazards considered here. Buildings may experience no or light physical
damage through to complete destruction. We review structural damage
from increased lateral and static loads, fire, abrasion and corrosion. We
refer the reader to Baxter et al. (2005) and Jenkins et al. (2014a) for a de-
tailed review of building impacts for tephra fall and PDC hazards.
3.7.1. Physical damage from lateral loads
Volcanic flows cause extensive damage to buildings located in and
near flow paths (e.g., de Bélizal et al., 2013) (Fig. 5). Historic eruptions
at Mt. Vesuvius (79 AD) and Mt. Pelée, Martinique (1902) and the re-
cent eruptions at Mt. St. Helens (1980), Unzen volcano (1991) and
Merapi volcano (1994, 2006, 2010) demonstrate that PDCs cause sub-
stantial damage to buildings and structures (Fig. 5A). Lahars generated
during and after the eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo (1991) and Chaitén
(2008) flowed into populated areas, causing considerable destruction
and burial of buildings (Janda et al., 1996; Pierson et al., 2013)
(Fig. 12) and large economic losses (Mercado et al., 1996). The principal
damaging mechanism of these flows is increased lateral loads. If lateral
loads are greater than the strength of a building's walls and roof (de-
pending on the flow height) structural damage will result and in the
worst case the building will collapse. Windows and doors are the
most vulnerable components in a building as they have low resistance
to lateral loads and are easily damaged by entrained debris impacts
(Baxter et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2007). Shielding of buildings by topog-
raphy and other buildings can affect damage distribution (Zuccaro and
Ianniello, 2004).
Lavaflows are less energetic than PDCs and lahars and cause damage
to buildings due to their considerable mass and ‘bulldozing’ action
(i.e., lava flows can push buildings over) (Fig. 5B). Weaker buildings
and those located in lava flow paths or on the flanks of the volcano
are most vulnerable and sustain the highest degree of damage. Numer-
ous volcanoes have produced lava flows that have caused damage to
buildings, including Mt. Vesuvius, Mt. Etna, Nyiragongo volcano, Kilau-
ea, Sakura-jima and Heimaey (Blong, 1984). Attempts have been
made to lessen the impacts of lava flows through water cooling of
flows (e.g., Heimaey, 1973: Williams, 1997) and by diverting flows
with barriers (e.g., Mt. Etna, 2001: Barberi et al., 2003) with varying
levels of success.
3.7.2. Physical damage from static loads
Tephra falls can cause damage to buildings by increased static load as
a result of tephra accumulation (Fig. 13). High intensity tephra falls
(N100 mm) can increase the static load on a building's roof and if it ex-
ceeds the load carrying capacity, damage or collapsemay occur (Spence
et al., 1996) (Fig. 13). Damage and indeed tolerance to damage is depen-
dent on building typology and maintenance, tephra density, thickness
and moisture content, as water will increase bulk density and therefore
tephra load (Johnston, 1997). During the 1973 Heimaey eruption nu-
merous houses with flat roofs suffered collapse following accumulation
of ~1 m of dry tephra (Blong, 1984). In contrast, during the 1991 Mt.
Pinatubo eruption, ~200 mm of wet tephra was sufficient to causesevere roof damage to ~50% of the building stock in the town of
Castillejos, whilst the remaining 50% of buildings sustained no or
minor damage (Spence et al., 1996). Tephra removal may exacerbate
roof damage due to increased static load from people on the roof
(Jenkins et al., 2014a). Buildings in close proximity to the volcano are
most vulnerable to structure damage as this is commonly where high
intensity tephra accumulations occur.
Non-structural components such as gutters and roof overhangs are
vulnerable to increased static loads. Because these elements were not
designed to withstand large loads, they will sustain damage first during
low intensity tephra fall.
3.7.3. Other impact mechanisms
Fire can also cause damage to buildings following PDCs, lava flows
and hot tephra particles. PDCs comprise of hot gases and particles and
if these infiltrate a building fires can be ignited. In addition, lava flows
have temperatures above the ignition point of common construction
materials and therefore can ignite fires causing damage to many build-
ings. In most cases if buildings are not destroyed by lava flow impact,
they will be destroyed by fire (Blong, 1984). Flow deposits may also
bury buildings causing further damage and preventing access (Fig. 12).
Abrasion of exterior elements such as windows and cladding may
occur as a result of tephra falls, PDCs or lahars however damage is likely
to be aesthetic. In addition, prolonged tephra exposure, in the presence
of water, may cause corrosion damage to metal roofs and gutters (Oze
et al., 2013).
4. Characteristics of impacts to critical infrastructure
Empirical data of impacts to critical infrastructure presented above
(Section 3) suggests that primary impacts occur on a continuum from
causing disruption to complete damage (Fig. 14). The hazard intensity
windowoverwhichdisruption anddamage occurs is dependent onhaz-
ard type and characteristics, infrastructure design and any preparedness
and response actions (Fig. 14). However, disruption resulting from teph-
ra fall, PDC and lahar hazards tends to occur at low hazard intensities
where there is insufficient intensity to cause damage. Physical damage
results at higher hazard intensities. In contrast, lava flows rarely cause
disruption to critical infrastructure systems and tend to cause damage
at all intensities (Fig. 5). Secondary disruptionwill also result from phys-
ical damage to infrastructure components. A semi-quantitative analysis
of infrastructure impacts (Fig. 15), which draws upon impact data from
Figs. 4, 5, 7, 9, and 13 shows that tephra falls tend to cause disruption
type impacts and less damage, whilst volcanic flows cause high levels
of both damage and associated secondary disruption. The solid line in
Table 7
Relevant tephra fall hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector.
Critical infrastructure sector Tephra fall hazard intensity metrics
Thickness Static
load
Particle
density
Surface
chemistry
Grainsize Moisture
content
Hardness
(abrasiveness)
Atmospheric
concentration
Electrical supply
Generation E E e e E
Transmission &
distribution
E e E e E t
Water supply network
Source E T E e T
Treatment E T E E E E
Buried network t t t E
Wastewater network
Treatment E T E e E E
Buried network t T t E
Transportation network
Road E t e e e e
Air E t t e E E
Rail E t t e T e
Sea e t E t e e T
Buildings E E e T e T
Communication systems e T e
Critical components
HVAC E T E e e T
Electronics E e E E e T
Abbreviations are: E— strong empirical bases (numerous post-eruption and analytical data); e—weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T— strong theoretical bases (likely to be
relevant but no post-eruption data); and t — weak theoretical bases (may be relevant). Refer to Table 1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics.
Table 8
Relevant PDC hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector.
Critical infrastructure sector PDC hazard intensity metrics
Dynamic
pressure
Velocity Temperature Thickness of
deposit
Electrical supply
Generation T T T
Transmission & distribution E E t t
Water supply network
Source E E T
Treatment T T t
Buried network e t
Wastewater network
Treatment T T t
Buried network
Transportation network
Road E T e
Air E T t
Rail T t
Sea t t
Buildings E E E e
Communication systems E E t
Critical components
HVAC T T T
Electronics t T T T
Abbreviations are: E — strong empirical bases (numerous post-eruption and analytical
data); e — weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T — strong theoretical bases
(likely to be relevant but no post-eruption data); and t — weak theoretical bases (may
be relevant). Refer to Table 1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics.
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those infrastructure that plot above or below this line showing their ten-
dency to preferentially cause one impact type over the other. A limitation
of Fig. 15 is that it assumes generic infrastructure design. There are nu-
merous different components, designs and network configurations for
such infrastructure systems which may vary within and between cities,
regions and countries. Each different infrastructure design can influence
vulnerability as each design will be tolerant to different hazard
intensities.
In the following subsections we discuss the characterisation of im-
pacts as causing disruption (Section 4.1) or damage (Section 4.2)
based upon hazard types and intensities and infrastructure design. We
explore how clean-up, exclusion zones, infrastructure design and differ-
ent hazard properties influence impact type and severity. We finish by
developing impact scales, based on hazard intensity thresholds, to esti-
mate vulnerability (Section 4.3.2).
4.1. Disruption impacts to critical infrastructure
Disruption to critical infrastructure can occur as a result of direct inter-
actionwith volcanic hazards (Section 4.1.1), as a result of hazard clean-up
operations (Section 4.1.2) and from restricted access with the implemen-
tation of emergency management exclusion zones (Section 4.1.3).
4.1.1. Critical infrastructure disruption from direct hazard impacts
Examining observed impacts (Section 3) and hazard intensity rela-
tionships (Figs. 4, 5, 7, 9, 13) it is evident thatmost infrastructure sectors
can be disrupted by the direct impact of tephra fall, PDCs and lahars. As
Fig. 14 shows, disruption tends to occur at low hazard intensities.
During low intensity tephra falls, there appears to be insufficient ac-
cumulated tephra mass to induce any increased static loading damage
on these infrastructure components and tephra will simply accumulate
on exposed components (Fig. 6B). Likewise, for low intensity regions of
PDCs and lahars (i.e., flow peripheries) there is insufficient dynamic
pressure to cause physical damage to critical infrastructure (Baxter
et al., 2005) and depositionwill occur. The deposition of unconsolidated
tephra in or on components will cause disruption and reduce function
by causing blockages (e.g., air and water filters) or limiting access andpreventing use of certain infrastructure such as buildings and transpor-
tation networks.
In addition, the presence of tephra particles in the atmosphere can
cause significant and prolonged disruption for some infrastructure, par-
ticularly transportation networks as suspended tephra will reduce visi-
bility and cause abrasion damage, for example, the 2010 eruption of
Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland and subsequent closure of European and North
American airpace for six days to prevent aircraft damage (Sammonds
et al., 2010).
Table 9
Relevant lava flow hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector.
Critical infrastructure Lava flow hazard intensity metrics
Presence of lava Depth of flow Dynamic pressure Velocity Temperature Cooling duration
Electrical supply
Generation T T T T
Transmission & distribution e e T T
Water supply network
Source T t t t
Treatment T t t t
Buried network e E
Wastewater network
Treatment T T T
Buried network t
Transportation network
Road E E T
Air E E T
Rail E
Sea E E
Buildings E E E E E
Communication systems T T T T
Critical components
HVAC T T t t
Electronics T T t
Abbreviations are: E— strong empirical bases (numerous post-eruption and analytical data); e—weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T— strong theoretical bases (likely to be
relevant but no post-eruption data); and t — weak theoretical bases (may be relevant). Refer to Table 1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics.
Table 10
Relevant lahar hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector.
Critical infrastructure sector Lahar hazard intensity metrics
Dynamic
pressure
Velocity Thickness of
deposit
Depth of
flow
Electrical supply
Generation T T T
Transmission & distribution E E t e
Water supply network
Source T T T
Treatment T T t t
Buried network e e
Wastewater network
Treatment T T t t
Buried network t t
Transportation network
Road E E E
Air T T E
Rail E E T
Sea t t e
Buildings E E E
Communication systems T T t t
Critical components
HVAC T T T
Electronics e e e
Abbreviations are: E — strong empirical bases (numerous post-eruption and analytical
data); e — weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T — strong theoretical bases
(likely to be relevant but no post-eruption data); and t — weak theoretical bases (may
be relevant). Refer to Table 1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics.
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ruption. Components with no or few moving parts are unlikely to be
damaged at low hazard intensities as tephra particles will not be lodged
between moving parts; a primary cause of abrasion damage. However,
these components will become covered in tephra limiting access and
causing disruption. Systems with electrical components (e.g., insulators
and electronic devices) may sustain short circuit faults in the presence
of wet tephra (Wardman et al., 2012c), disrupting their operation. In ad-
dition, some infrastructure systems and components, such as road trans-
portation and electrical insulators, are resilient to damage at all tephra
hazard intensities and are likely to be disrupted at high hazard intensities
(Figs. 4 and 8A).
Somedisruptionmay only affect the infrastructure operators. For ex-
ample, after the 2011 PCCVC eruption, sandfilters at the Barilochewater
treatment plant required increased maintenance time for cleaning
however during this time there were no water outages and services
continued as normal (Wilson et al., 2013). In these instances, increased
maintenance requirements will incur additional costs and may prevent
operators from undertaking other tasks.
4.1.2. Critical infrastructure disruption during clean-up operations
Tephra falls, PDCs and lahars produce unconsolidated deposits that
require removal and clean-up to avoid ongoing and prolonged disrup-
tion or to reinstate critical infrastructure services (Wilson et al.,
2012b). Proper clean-up will reduce tephra remobilisation, and mini-
mise the potential for future damage (e.g., abrasion and corrosion)
and human health effects which can result from inhalation of tephra
particles (Horwell and Baxter, 2006).Whilst it is possible for some infra-
structure sectors to clean deposits from their equipment and sites with-
out causing disruption (e.g., live cleaning of electrical networks), many
sectors will have to partially or completely shutdown (a controlled
shutdown) to undertake cleaning. Performing controlled shutdowns
of all or parts of an infrastructure network will cause further disruption
and prevent society from using these services. In many cases however,
this is unavoidable as continued operation may result in physical dam-
age of components leading to further disruption. Controlled shutdowns
for cleaning purposes have been documented for electrical supplies to
prevent continual flashover (Fig. 4), water supplies to prevent water
shortages and plant damage (Fig. 7A) and at airport runways to prevent
aircraft damage and tephra remobilisation (Fig. 9A). Ultimately the de-
cision to clean up unconsolidated deposits and/or initiate controlledshutdowns will be dependent on hazard intensity but also on the oper-
ational practices of the particular infrastructure operators.4.1.3. Critical infrastructure disruption in exclusion zones
Disruption to critical infrastructure can occur without the presence
of any volcanic hazards through the implementation and enforcement
of evacuation and exclusion zones by emergency management author-
ities. Generally these zones will be developed for flow hazards, as
these are more dangerous than tephra fall. Zones may be implemented
prior to the onset of an eruption or during an eruption to prevent loss of
life in dangerous areas. If infrastructure networks or sites are located
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not be able to access these areas. For example, during the eruption of
Montserrat (1995–ongoing) and the subsequent destruction of Plym-
outh, the water utility had to move some of the springs and wells
which were located inside the exclusion zone (Sword-Daniels et al.,
2014). If infrastructurewithin an exclusion zone is damaged it is unlike-
ly that personnel will be able to enter to perform repairs unless an
agreement is made with emergency management officials.4.2. Physical damage to critical infrastructure
All volcanic hazards considered here can cause physical damage to
critical infrastructure sectors and components. Physical damage has
been observed occurring at all intensity levels for PDCs, lahars and
lava flows (Fig. 5) and at high intensity tephra falls (Figs. 4, 5, 7, 9, 13).
Abrasion damage can occur to any exposed element as a result of
contamination with tephra particles or from passing PDCs and lahars.
Components with moving parts such as water and wastewater pumps,
electrical switches, and cooling fans are more vulnerable as tephra par-
ticles may become lodged between moving surfaces. Abrasion damage
to pumps has been documented for water supply and wastewater net-
works at tephra thicknesses of N30 mm and N4 mm, respectively
(Fig. 7). Whilst these reports document the tephra thickness at which
damage occurred, hazard exposure time, which is a primary control for
abrasion severity, is not documented. Likewise, corrosion of metal sur-
faces, particularly building roofs (Fig. 13), also occurs over time. In addi-
tion, increasing tephra thickness will increase corrosion severity as
more acidic tephra leachates will be delivered to the roof surface (Oze
et al., 2013).
At higher tephra fall intensities structural damage can occur due to
increased static loading. Most observed tephra-induced structural dam-
age has occurred to buildings (residential and commercial) and their
roofs (Fig. 13), as research has tended to focus on occupant safety. How-
ever, tephra accumulations on other exposed infrastructure compo-
nents (e.g., electrical substation gantries, water storage and treatment
tanks) are likely to cause structural damage if the load exceeds the
structure's strength. Damage severity is influenced by tephra density
and moisture content as these parameters increase so does the static
load on the structure (Macedonio and Costa, 2012; Jenkins et al.,
2014a). Damage to non-structural elements is likely to occur first as
they are inherently weaker than engineered structural components.
PDCs, lahars and lava flows cause physical damage at all hazard in-
tensities (Fig. 5). The primary damagemechanism is increased dynamic
pressures which overcome structural design causing structures to fail.
PDCs and lahars become rapidly less energetic with increasing distance
from vent and flow axis (Spence et al., 2004b; Jenkins et al., 2013) and
higher damage severity is expected in flow paths and river valleys and
in proximal areas (Baxter et al., 2005). However, damage assessments
of Baxter et al. (2005) and Jenkins et al. (2013) suggest that dynamic
pressures can vary between ~1 and 5 kPa within tens of metres,
resulting in non-uniform building damage. For most infrastructure sec-
tors there is a lack of data (Fig. 5) regarding gradations in damage sever-
ity and therefore as a first order approximation, we assume a binary
impactmodel,where damage is predicated on thepresence of a volcanic
flow(s). However for building damage there is sufficient impact data
(e.g., Spence et al., 2004a; Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) to as-
sess gradational damage.
Lava flows and sufficiently hot PDCs will cause fire damage to com-
bustible structures and materials. Once a structure is ignited it will gen-
erally be completely destroyed byfire; formost structures, the benefit of
extinguishing the fire is far outweighed by life safety concerns that
would be encountered in an attempt. Buildings, structures and infra-
structure (e.g., transportation routes) will become inundated and cov-
ered by volcanic flows, resulting in disruption or permanent damage,
especially for lava which will solidify once cooled.4.3. Estimating critical infrastructure vulnerability
Estimating vulnerability of critical infrastructure to volcanic erup-
tions can be difficult due to the number of facets that influence vulner-
ability and resilience. By reviewing empirical data (Figs. 4, 5, 7, 9, 13)
relationships between disruption and/or damage and hazard intensity
(Section 4.3.1) can be estimated and presented using impact scales
(Section 4.3.2). When assessing vulnerability, consideration must also
be given to the interactions between multiple volcanic hazards
(Section 4.3.3).
4.3.1. Hazard intensity metrics
Volcanic hazards have a number of different hazard properties
which can cause disruption and damage. This is in contrast to other nat-
ural hazards where there are generally few hazard properties which
contribute to disruption and damage. For example, the principal damag-
ing property of earthquakes is ground shaking, commonly assessed by
peak ground acceleration, whereas PDCs can cause damage through lat-
eral loading (dynamic pressure) and fire (temperature). We define
these properties collectively as hazard intensity metrics (HIMs). When
assessing vulnerability a single HIM may not accurately capture all of
the impactful attributes that a hazard has to a particular infrastructure
sector. To this end, Tables 7–10 present the relative relevance of differ-
ent HIMs for each volcanic hazard and infrastructure sector and provide
an indication on whether these are strong empirical or theoretical rela-
tionships. Selection of a HIM for vulnerability and risk assessment
should consider: (1) the HIMs' appropriateness to accurately describe
a range of impact severity; (2) the ease of HIM measurement in the
field or laboratory; and (3) the applicability of the HIM to hazard
model outputs. The most appropriate and commonly used HIM candi-
dates are thickness or mass loading (tephra fall), dynamic pressure
(PDC),flowheight (lavaflow) andflowvelocity (lahar), however differ-
ent HIMs can be used depending on the impact(s) and infrastructure
sector(s) of interest.
4.3.2. Disruption and damage states
To classify and categorise impacts to critical infrastructure a com-
mon impact scale can be used (Blong, 2003b)which includes disruption
and damage states. In volcanology, impact scales are available for build-
ing damage from tephra fall (e.g., Spence et al., 1996; Blong, 2003a) and
PDC impacts (e.g., Spence et al., 2004b; Baxter et al., 2005). Here we ex-
pand impact scale coverage to include critical infrastructure sectors ex-
amined in Section 3 for tephra fall, PDC, lava flow and lahar hazards
(Tables 11–14).We define four common impact levels: Level 0, no dam-
age; Level 1, cleaning required; Level 2, repair required; and Level 3, re-
placement or financially expensive repair. Four levels were chosen
because empirical impact data across a range of impact levels was lack-
ing for most infrastructure and therefore further subdivision was not
justified. Separate descriptions for disruption and physical damage are
provided to reflect impact dichotomy presented in Sections 4.1 and
4.2. For each impact scale (Tables 11–14) the most diagnostic HIM,
based on its relationship with empirically observed impacts, was used,
these are: thickness (tephra fall); dynamic pressure (PDC); flow depth
(lava flow); and flow velocity (lahar) (Tables 7–10). Intensity thresh-
olds were derived by categorising empirical impact data in Figs. 4, 5, 7,
9, and 13 and Section 3 and by using expert judgement to indicate antic-
ipated impacts where data was lacking, primarily at high hazard
intensities.
For tephra fall (Table 11), different intensity thresholds were de-
rived for each critical infrastructure sector because each sector responds
differently given a specific hazard intensity. For example, ~1 mm of
tephra will close an airport whilst this tephra thickness will not cause
any damage to a building. Differences in how infrastructures respond
to tephra fall precluded the use of generic tephra fall thresholds which
would be applicable to all infrastructure sectors. In contrast, for PDCs
and lahars (Tables 12 and 14) we consider impacts to be binary for all
Table 11
Proposed disruption and damage levels for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of tephra fall thickness (mm).
Level Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Description No damage Cleaning required Repair required Replacement or financially
expensive repair
Electrical supply Threshold (mm) b3 3–10 10–100 N100
Damage No damage Possible abrasion to some moving
parts, infiltration of tephra into
substation gravel.
Damage to exposed equipment
especially those with moving
parts, possible electrical line
breakage.
Structural damage to some
equipment at generation and
transmission/distribution sites,
irreparable damage to moving
parts (e.g., hydro power
turbines).
Disruption No disruption Temporary disruption to service caused by insulator flashover, cleaning and
repair.
Widespread disruption to
electrical supply with possible
permanent disruption.
Water supply network Threshold (mm) b1 1–20 20–100 N100
Damage No damage Possible clogging of filters and
some abrasion to moving
components.
Damage to pumping equipment,
other moving parts and infilling of
tanks.
Collapse of reservoir roofs and
infilling of open reservoirs and
tanks.
Disruption No disruption Normal operation with increased
frequency of filter cleaning and
increased turbidity.
Contamination of water and
increased treatment required.
Possible water use restrictions.
Severe contamination of water
supply and exhaustion of supply
due to damage and/or increased
demand.
Wastewater network Threshold (mm) b3 3–10 10–50 N50
Damage No damage Possible minor abrasion to pumps,
clogging of filters and possible
interference with chemical
treatment process.
Large amounts of sedimentation
in network some causing
blockages, some damage to
treatment plant components and
possible infilling of open tanks.
Widespread sedimentation
throughout entire network
causing some blockages,
irreparable damage to pumps and
extensive structural damage to
treatment plant components.
Disruption No disruption Reduced capacity, operation with
increased cleaning of filters.
Temporary disruption to service
to unblock network and clean
tanks possibly resulting in
discharge of untreated sewage.
Long term to possible permanent
disruption to service. Unable to
treat wastewater, discharge of
untreated sewage.
Airport Threshold (mm) b1 1–30 30–150 N150
Damage No damage Possible abrasion of runway and
apron markings and possible
abrasion of paved surfaces.
Moderate abrasion of paved
surfaces and landing lights.
Complete burial.
Disruption Airport open Airport closure, reduced visibility. Possible permanent closure.
Road Threshold (mm) b2 2–50 50–150 N150
Damage No damage Possible abrasion of road
markings and possible abrasion of
paved surfaces.
Moderate abrasion of paved
surfaces, weak bridges may
experience structural damage.
Complete burial, structural
damage to some bridges.
Disruption No disruption Reduced visibility, loss of traction,
covering of markings and possible
road closure.
Roads impassable for 2WD
vehicles. Dangerous driving
conditions.
Roads impassable if tephra is
unconsolidated, compacted
tephra may be driven on by 4WD
vehicles. Widespread road
closures.
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Rail Threshold (mm) b1 1–30 30–150 N150
No damage Possible abrasion and/or corrosion of railway tracks and signals, jamming of
mechanical signals and contamination of track ballast.
Complete burial
No disruption Reduced visibility, signals and
communications disrupted.
Loss of traction and possible
derailing.
Impassable.
Marine Threshold (mm) b1 1–30 30–150 N150
No damage Possible abrasion of paved
surfaces.
Moderate abrasion of paved
surfaces, pumice rafts covering
the water surface.
Complete burial of paved surfaces.
No disruption Reduced visibility on land and sea. Ship movements obstructed by
pumice rafts.
Inoperable.
Vehicles Threshold (mm) b3 3–30 30–100 N100
Damage No damage Possible abrasion and/or corrosion
to windshields, paintwork, aircraft
leading edges, moving parts and
clogging of air filters.
Extensive abrasion of moving
parts and possible seizing of
engines.
Extensive damage that is
uneconomical to repair.
Disruption No disruption Infiltration of tephra into personal
compartments.
Frequent fluid and filter
replacement and possible
cleaning and reconditioning of
engines.
Completely inoperable.
Communications Threshold (mm) b5 5–30 30–100 N100
Damage No damage No damage Blockage and shutdown of cooling
systems and damage to exposed
components (e.g., dishes, towers,
lines).
Structural damage to
communication components
(e.g., dishes, towers, lines).
Disruption No disruption Overloading of communication
network from high demand and
possible signal attenuation and
interference.
Temporary disruption to service
due to shutdowns and cleaning.
Permanent disruption.
Buildings Threshold (mm) b10 10–100 100–500 N500
Damage No damage Light roof damage and gutter
damage and possible abrasion to
windows and cladding.
Severe roof damage, damage to
vertical structure, possible partial
collapse.
Complete roof collapse and severe
damage to rest of building.
Disruption Occupied Infiltration of tephra into building
and able to be occupied.
Large volumes of tephra inside
building as well as parts of the
structure, uninhabitable.
Beyond economic repair and
uninhabitable.
Critical components Threshold (mm) b1 1–10 10–50 N50
Damage No damage No damage Abrasion of moving parts and
blockage of filters.
Extensive damage to most
components.
Disruption No disruption Reduced function until cleaned. Reduced function and temporary
shutdowns until cleaned.
Uneconomic to repair, disruption
to service until replaced.
Disruption and damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Italicised threshold values indicate where expert judgement was used to derive theoretical estimates of when disruption
and damage would occur. Disruption and damage at higher intensities (Level 3) include those at lower intensities (Level 1).
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Table 12
Proposed disruption and damage levels for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of PDC dynamic pressure (kPa).
Level Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Description No damage Cleaning required Repair required Replacement or financially
expensive repair
Electrical supply Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Destruction of
transmission and
distribution lines, poles,
towers and substations and
damage to generation sites.
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to
service.
Water supply network Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment
facilities and above-ground
pipes and infilling of un-
covered water sources.
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to
service.
Wastewater network Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment
facilities and above-ground
pipes, infilling of ponds and
blockage of drains.
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to
service.
Transport Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Complete burial and heat
damage of paved surfaces
and railways. Destruction
of some bridges. Infilling of
harbours.
Disruption No disruption – – Roads and rail impassable
and widespread closures.
Vehicles Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Vehicles buried,
extensively damaged by
pressure and heat and
swept away.
Disruption No disruption – – Completely inoperable.
Communications Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage – – Destruction of ground level
components (e.g., lines,
cabinets, exchanges).
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption and
signal interference caused
by pyroclastic surges.
Buildings Threshold (kPa) b1 1–10 10–25 N25
Damage No damage Openings damaged,
possible internal fire
damage, external fire
damage, sandblasting of
walls and some damage to
weak masonry.
All opening damaged,
missile impacts evident
and partial collapse of
walls and/or roof,
extensive internal fire
damage.
Complete damage to
building with few
structural elements
remaining.
Disruption Occupied Infiltration of tephra,
missiles and building
material into building and
fire damage making it
uninhabitable.
Beyond economic repair
and uninhabitable.
Critical components Threshold (kPa) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Complete destruction of
exposed electronic
equipment with most
being swept away and/or
buried and melting of
plastic components.
Disruption No disruption – – No functionality and
uneconomic to repair.
Disruption and damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Impacts to most infrastructure are considered binary (see
Section 4.2) thus there are no descriptions for Level 1 or Level 2 except for buildings where there is additional empirical data. Italicised threshold values indicate where expert judgement
was used to derive theoretical estimates of when disruption and damage would occur.
176 G. Wilson et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 286 (2014) 148–182infrastructure sectors except buildings.Whilst theremay be gradational
infrastructure impacts from PDCs and lahars at flow margins (see
Section 4.2) we found insufficient empirical evidence to derive hazard
thresholds for intermediary impact states. Intermediary impact statesfor building damage are included and are drawn from the existing scales
of Baxter et al. (2005) and Spence et al. (2004b). For lavaflowhazardswe
consider impacts to be binary for all infrastructure sectors (Table 13)
based on the destructiveness of lava flows.
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number of assumptions have beenmade, such as: generic infrastructure
design and typology, one discrete hazard occurrence and no mitigation
actions taken by infrastructure operators. These scales should only be
used either as guides or at regional scale vulnerability and risk assess-
ment. Whenever possible, local vulnerability studies which account
for each system's vulnerability characteristics should be undertaken
first.
4.3.3. Interactions between volcanic hazards
During a volcanic eruption multiple hazardous phenomena often
occur simultaneously or in short succession. This is caused by changes
in eruption style (from effusive to explosive or from explosive toTable 13
Proposed disruption and damage levels for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a func
Level Level 0 Lev
Description No damage Cle
Electrical supply Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Water supply network Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Wastewater network Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Transport Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Vehicles Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Communications Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Buildings Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption Occupied –
Critical components Threshold (m) b0 –
Damage No damage –
Disruption No disruption –
Disruption and damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume
Section 4.2) thus there are no descriptions for Level 1 or Level 2.effusive), during explosive eruptions or as a result of multiple vents
erupting simultaneously. The interaction and impact of multiple volca-
nic hazards on critical infrastructure may lead to different vulnerability
outcomes compared to single hazard impacts. However, multiple volca-
nic hazard impacts are rarely studied because of the increased complex-
ity of hazard and infrastructure interactions.
One study that addresses multi-volcanic hazard impacts is Zuccaro
et al. (2008). They investigate impacts on residential buildings from
tephra fall with simultaneous earthquakes or PDCs for a simulated Mt.
Vesuvius eruption. For the combination of tephra fall and earthquake
a decrease in the seismic response of the building was observed,
i.e., the building is more susceptible to earthquake damage if tephra is
deposited on the roof. For the scenario of tephra fall followed by ation of lava flow depth (m).
el 1 Level 2 Level 3
aning required Repair required Replacement or financially
expensive repair
– N0
– Destruction of
transmission and
distribution lines, poles,
towers and damage a
burial of substations and
generation sites.
– Permanent disruption to
service.
– N0
– Damage to treatment
facilities and above-ground
pipes and infilling of un-
covered water sources.
– Permanent disruption to
service.
– N0
– Damage to treatment
facilities and above-ground
pipes, infilling of ponds and
burial of drains.
– Permanent disruption to
service.
– N0
– Complete burial heat
damage to paved surfaces
and railways.
– Transportation routes
impassable resulting in
permanent closure.
– N0
– Vehicles buried and burnt.
– Completely inoperable.
– N0
– Destruction and burial of
ground level components
(e.g., lines, cabinets,
exchanges).
– Permanent disruption.
– N0
– Complete fire damage to
building and burial.
– Beyond economic repair
and uninhabitable.
– N0
– Complete destruction and
burial of exposed
electronic equipment and
melting of plastic
components.
– No functionality and
uneconomic to repair.
generic infrastructure design. Impacts to all infrastructure are considered binary (see
Table 14
Proposed disruption and damage levels for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of lahar velocity (m/s).
Level Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
Description No damage Cleaning required Repair required Replacement or financially
expensive repair
Electrical supply Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Destruction of transmission
and distribution lines, poles,
towers and substations and
damage to generation sites
(e.g., abrasion to hydro pow-
er turbines).
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to
service.
Water supply
network
Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment
facilities, above-ground
pipes and water intake
structures and infilling of
uncovered water sources.
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to
service due to damage and
severe contamination.
Wastewater
network
Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment
facilities and above-ground
pipes, infilling of ponds and
blockage of drains.
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to
service.
Transport Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Complete burial and erosion
damage to paved surfaces
and railways. Destruction of
some bridges and scour of
embankments. Infilling of
harbour.
Disruption No disruption – – Transportation routes
impassable resulting in
permanent closure.
Vehicles Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Vehicles buried, extensively
damaged by pressure and
swept away.
Disruption No disruption – – Completely inoperable.
Communications Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Destruction of ground level
components (e.g., lines, cab-
inets, exchanges).
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption.
Buildings Threshold (m/s) b1 1–3 3–5 N5
Damage No damage Damage to openings and
non-structural elements and
infilling of building interior
with debris.
Moderate structural damage
to walls, some partially
collapse.
Complete damage to
building with few structural
elements remaining and/or
swept off foundations.
Disruption Occupied Infiltration of debris and building material into building
making it uninhabitable.
Beyond economic repair and
uninhabitable.
Critical
components
Threshold (m/s) b0 – – N0
Damage No damage – – Complete destruction of
exposed electronic
equipment with most being
swept away and/or buried.
Disruption No disruption – – No functionality and
uneconomic to repair.
Disruption and damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Impacts to most infrastructure are considered binary (see
Section 4.2) thus there are no descriptions for Level 1 or Level 2 except for buildings where there is additional empirical data. Italicised threshold values indicate where expert judgement
was used to derive theoretical estimates of when disruption and damage would occur.
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roof from tephra fall provided a stabilising effect when the building
was impacted by a PDC.Whilst this approach estimatedbuilding vulner-
ability it could also be applied to critical infrastructure. Multi-volcanic
hazard research should be advanced to develop vulnerability assess-
ments for volcanic eruptions and/or scenarios rather than just specific
individual volcanic hazards.5. Future direction
5.1. Implications for volcanic risk assessment
Over the past few decades there has been an emphasis on under-
standing, quantifying and modelling volcanic hazards. This has pro-
duced a number of high quality empirical, physical and probabilistic
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various volcanic hazards (e.g., Schilling, 1998; Bonadonna, 2006;
Charbonnier and Gertisser, 2009; Wadge, 2009; Marzocchi et al.,
2010; Jenkins et al., 2012). These models have contributed to a detailed
understanding of volcanic hazards and have greatly improved the
contribution of volcanology science to disaster risk reduction and
management.
At present, volcanic vulnerability and comprehensive risk assess-
ments are less advanced than hazard assessments (Section 2), however
the contributions of Blong (1984), Spence et al. (1996), Blong (2003a),
Baxter et al. (2005), Wardman et al. (2012c), Wilson et al. (2012b)
and Jenkins et al. (2014a) have progressively increased and broadened
the knowledge of volcanic impact occurrence, damage mechanisms,
mitigation strategies and emergency management response. Whilst
these studies go a longway towards improved vulnerability assessment,
collectively they have not progressed to the point of developing robust
quantitative vulnerability models to inform land-use planning and in-
frastructure design codes (perhaps with the exception of residential
buildings). Additionally, lack of awareness of volcanic impacts in critical
infrastructure mitigation strategies, such as citing, design and contin-
gency planning rarely, if ever, consider volcanic hazards. Whilst land-
use planning and engineering designmight not be appropriate in all sit-
uations it is appropriate for sensitive and/or high value infrastructure,
such as nuclear power stations. For example, the International Atomic
Energy Agency initiative (IAEA, 2013) has considered volcanic hazards
in site evaluation at nuclear power installations. TheNZVISG science/in-
dustry collaboration is also an example of critical infrastructure organi-
sations supporting and using volcanic resiliency research to reduce risk
(Wilson et al., 2014). And global awareness is increasingwith the inclu-
sion of volcanic hazards for the first time in the Global Assessment Re-
port on Disasters Risk Reduction 2015 (Jenkins et al., 2014b).
Engineering design, often implemented at little extra cost, and effective
contingency planning is likely to offer substantial societal benefits
through reduced infrastructure service downtime and restoration
costs. A cost–benefit analysis would be the next step to investigate the
value of such mitigation strategies.
5.2. Goals for the next 10 to 25 years
Reducing the impacts of volcanic eruptions on society is the ultimate
goal of volcanic riskmanagement. Population growth, land-use pressure
and society's increasing expectation of infrastructure performance dur-
ing and after disasters will make this a challenge for critical infrastruc-
ture operators.
To progress towards increased critical infrastructure resilience, a
crucial first step is for infrastructure operators to include volcanic haz-
ards as a risk routinely managed. A value proposition is required
where scientists and operators identify and establish the risk context
and demonstrate the value of risk mitigation. The scientific community
must support this collaboration through producing the best possible
quality hazard, vulnerability and risk information to support riskmitiga-
tion and management. Broad and in-depth understanding of direct and
indirect impacts from all credible volcanic hazards and hazard intensi-
ties is required. By first understanding the intensity at which impacts
occur for different critical infrastructure components and the resulting
impact severity enables decisions to be made about the most appropri-
ate mitigation strategy for the particular situation; whether it be land-
use planning, infrastructure design or contingency planning (Table 6).
To improve volcanic vulnerability assessments, the volcanology com-
munity in partnership with engineers, infrastructure operators, risk
and continuity managers, and the communities which rely on critical
services, need to identify safe and acceptable levels of critical infrastruc-
ture performance during volcanic crises by robustly analysing existing
impact data and seeking additional quantitative empirical and theoret-
ical data. Continued investment in research to identify and refine vulner-
ability (or conversely resilience) of critical infrastructure requirescontinued field observations, laboratory experiments and numerical
modelling to inform mitigation strategies and resilience design. We ac-
knowledge that this can be resource intensive and in some cases imprac-
tical due to hazard and infrastructure complexity, but if the benefit of
mitigation strategies is well defined and recognised then such invest-
ments become justified. Mitigation for volcanic hazards is also likely to
reduce risk for other non-volcanic hazards.
Future research priorities to reduce risk and increase resilience for
critical infrastructure sectors that we believe should be addressed with-
in the next 10 to 25 years are:
(1) Focus on quantitative vulnerability estimation for critical infra-
structure impacted by volcanic hazards. This should include
open source standardised methodologies and databases for col-
lection of quantitative impact data from post-eruption field as-
sessments, laboratory experiments and numerical modelling
and the derivation of fragility and vulnerability functions. Devel-
oping such approaches for critical infrastructurewill be challeng-
ing due to the wide variability in system and component design,
operational requirements and the interdependency between dif-
ferent infrastructure sectors. However, a standardised approach
allows repeatable quantitative vulnerability estimates to be
made and facilitates direct comparisons with other critical infra-
structure and natural hazards.
(2) Laboratory analysis of infrastructure systems and components
under controlled conditions tomore robustly informvulnerability
estimates; particularly for high-value infrastructure components
from which society requires high levels of reliable performance.
(3) Increasing the awareness of volcanic hazards, their impacts and
the value of volcanic risk management for critical infrastructure
operators. This may be achieved through partnerships between
volcanic scientists, infrastructure operators and engineers to en-
courage the inclusion of volcanic hazards in infrastructure site
evaluation/assessment criteria, design and contingency planning
aimed at increasing resilience.
(4) Demonstrate the value of volcanic riskmanagement for critical in-
frastructure by the provision of useful andunderstandable vulner-
ability and mitigation information, backed by cost–benefit
analysis, to critical infrastructure operators so informed decision
making regarding infrastructure operation and resilience can
take place.
6. Summary
This paper reviews disruption and physical damage impacts to criti-
cal infrastructure sectors from tephra falls, pyroclastic density currents
(PDC), lava flows and lahars. Data are primarily from post-eruption im-
pact assessments and are generally qualitative, although several quanti-
tative assessments are available. Impacts to critical infrastructure can be
classified on a continuum from disruption to complete damage. Impact
severity is primarily controlled by the type of hazard, its intensity and
the specific type of infrastructure and its design. In general, disruption
occurs at low hazard intensities for tephra falls, PDCs and lahars, whilst
physical damage occurs at higher intensities for all hazards. Lava flows
are the exception and tend to cause physical damage at all intensities.
Quantitative volcanic hazard assessment is at an advanced state,
however, quantitative vulnerability assessments are lacking. The lack
of these assessments can be attributed to: (1) difficulties in determining
which hazard characteristic is the primary cause of damage to infra-
structure and its accurate measurement; (2) ongoing eruptions, clean-
up and mitigative strategies can alter infrastructure impacts and are
challenging to account for in assessments; and (3) lack of volcanic con-
struction or design codes, or performance guidelines which could
prompt and facilitate detailed vulnerability assessment. Despite this,
several studies have assessed the vulnerability of buildings and critical
infrastructure sectors impacted by tephra fall, PDCs and lahars. To
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nology, impacts to critical infrastructure from volcanic hazards should
be quantified in a more robust, systematic and standardised manner.
We have highlighted a number of aspects to consider when estimating
vulnerability and developing fragility and vulnerability functions, such
as hazard intensity measures, hazard interactions, infrastructure inter-
dependencies, limitations and uncertainties.
We challenge the volcanology community to create a consistent
methodology for the development and refinement of physical vulnera-
bility assessment for all volcanic hazards and critical infrastructure. The
final goal is to provide robust quantified vulnerability estimates for vol-
canic riskmanagers, decisionmakers and policy experts in order tomin-
imise disruption, reduce economic losses and loss of life during volcanic
eruptions.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2014.08.030.Acknowledgements
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